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In 2004, President Bush announced his plan to ensure that most 
Americans would have electronic health records within ten years. A l­
though substantial progress has been made toward achieving that 
goal, this progress has primarily reflected institutional interests and 
priorities by focusing on system architecture and technical standards. 
This article argues that in order for a nationwide transition to elec­
tronic medical records to be successful, however, the system must re­
ceive acceptance from patients and physicians. Thus, it must address 
and protect issues at the forefront o f  their concerns: namely, privacy 
and confidentiality. Instead o f merely adopting the minimal protec­
tions afforded by HIPAA, the electronic health records system must 
embrace an autonomy-based, default position o f full patient control 
over personal information, with very limited exceptions. Conse­
quently, hard choices must be made as to the architectural and patient 
consent models that may involve subjugating some interoperability 
and comprehensiveness ambitions to principled protections o f patient 
autonomy.
I. I n t r o d u c t io n
On April 26, 2004, President Bush announced his plan to ensure 
that most Americans would have electronic health records within ten 
years.1 Although some technical and many financial issues remain, there
t  Copyright © 2006, Nicolas P. Terry and Leslie P. Francis. All Rights Reserved.
* Chester A. Myers Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Professor 
of Health Management & Policy, Saint Louis University, e-mail: terry@slu.edu. I thank Michael Hen­
derson, SLU J.D. candidate 2007, for his most helpful editorial suggestions.
** Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Alfred C. Emery Professor of Law, Univer­
sity of Utah, e-mail: francisl@law.utah.edu.
1. The White H ouse, T ransforming H ealth Ca re : The President’s H ealth 
Information Technology Plan , http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/technology/economic_policy 
200404/chap3.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2006). A more generalized commitment was announced in the 
2006 State of the Union Address: “We will make wider use of electronic records and other health in-
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has been substantial progress towards this goal. The project has now 
reached the point where acceptance by patients and physicians is crucial. 
Tn the health information technology (HIT) domain, the interests of pa­
tients and physicians do not always coincide;2 patients tend to want more 
connectivity and online service from their physicians, while physicians 
are still ambivalent about technologically mediated care.3 However, phy­
sicians and patients share common ground over many of the confidential­
ity and privacy issues raised by electronic health records (EHRs).
To date, the Bush administration has framed the EHR privacy- 
confidentiality issue quite narrowly, identifying only divergent state laws 
as creating barriers to successful implementation of its grand scheme. Tn 
fact, the issue runs far deeper.4 Tn our view, the proposed national EHR 
system creates some fundamental privacy-confidentiality issues that must 
be satisfactorily resolved prior to implementation. Patients who lack 
trust in the national EHR system will opt out or frustrate many of the 
system’s goals by hiding information from their physicians. Equally, phy­
sicians who perceive the new system as inconsistent with their profes­
sional standards of confidentiality or as creating liability “traps” will 
avoid participation or, if given no choice, will reduce or distort their 
charting.
formation technology, to help control costs and reduce dangerous medical errors.” President George 
W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 31, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060131~10.html).
2. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Prescriptions sans Frontieres (or H ow  I  Stopped Worrying 
about Viagra on the Web but Grew Concerned about the Future o f  Healthcare Delivery), 4 Y a le  J. 
H e a l th  P o l’y L. & E th ic s  183, 226-32 (2004).
3. See Health Information Technology Activities at the Agency for Healthcare Research and  
Quality: Hearing Before the S. Comm, on Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcomm. on Tech­
nology, Innovation, and Competitiveness, 109th Cong. 2, 6 (2005) (statement of Carolyn M. Clancy, 
M.D., Director, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services) (“Unlike the baseball field in the movie Field of Dreams [sic], we have dramatic examples of 
the building of health IT systems, whose designers found physicians and other clinicians neither came 
nor played.”); see also Robert G. Brooks & Nir Menachemi, Physicians’ Use o f  Email With Patients: 
Factors Influencing Electronic Communication and Adherence to Best Practices, J. Med. I n t e r n e t  
Res., Jan.-Mar. 2006, available at http://www.jmir.Org/2006/l/e2/ (survey reporting only modest ad­
vances in the adoption of e-mail communication with patients by physicians); Wall Street Journal 
Online/Harris Interactive Health-Care Poll, Few Patients Use or Have Access to Online Services for 
Communicating with their Doctors, but Most Would Like To, Sept. 22, 2006, http://www. 
harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/wsjhealthnews/WSJOnline_Hl_Health-CarePoll2006vol5_ 
issl6.pdf (finding that large majority of adults would like e-mail reminders and online appointment 
scheduling and that a majority of patients consider the offer of such services as a discriminator in 
choosing a provider).
4. One issued Request for Proposal on “Privacy and Security Solutions for Health Information 
Exchange” focuses on the need “to assess and develop solutions to address state and business privacy 
and security practices that may pose challenges to interoperable health information exchange.” U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Fact Sheet: Health Information Technology Requests for Proposals 
(June 6, 2005), http://www.os.dhhs.gov/healthit/documents/RFPfactsheet.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
This resulted in a $11.5 million contract awarded to Privacy and Security Solutions to study the issue. 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Awards Contracts to Advance Nationwide 
Interoperable Health Information Technology (Oct. 6, 2005), available at http://www.hhs. 
gov/news/press/2005press/20051006a.html.
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There are great advantages to using electronic records more exten­
sively, both within the offices of individual providers, where they are 
known as electronic medical records (EMRs), and also when such re­
cords are linked across multiple providers, in which case they are known 
as electronic health records (EHRs). One obvious advantage is clarity. 
Electronic records are far more readable than handwritten documents 
stored in fading folders, allowing providers to avoid the low-hanging fruit 
of medical and medication errors. Another advantage is searchability: 
electronic records can be scanned for drug interactions or for consistent 
patterns of symptoms. They can also be matched with evidence-based 
protocols to discern treatment strategies that do not meet the standard of 
care or to recommend improved methods of patient management.
Moreover, in an EHR, records cease to exist in information silos, 
thus creating additional advantages over paper records. First, they are 
combined or interlinked to maximize coordination of care. Second, they 
offer enhanced accessibility: electronic records can be available to pro­
viders all over the country and the world, as mobile as the patients they 
describe. Finally, on a social level, EHRs are searchable for patterns of 
disease, prescription use (or abuse), treatment outcomes, or even the 
costs of therapy. These great benefits cannot be gainsaid.
At the same time, these advantages are threats. When inappropri­
ate or false material is included in records, it will be persistent and rever­
berate in subsequent patient management decisions. Linkages may be 
drawn that violate patient requests for, or expectations of, confidential­
ity. EHRs may be searched in problematic ways. Records might be ac­
cessible to those who many believe should not have access to them (sec­
ondary users). Commercial entities may seek to add medical data to 
their other data holdings and sell the aggregated data for marketing or 
surveillance purposes. Groups might be targeted in epidemiological 
searches.
As a regional or national EHR becomes a technologically achiev­
able goal with broad congressional support, we must distinguish the 
genuine advantages of EHRs from the deep problems they present and 
engineer the technical and legal models to minimize the problems. Yet, 
these are difficult tasks. Several possible EHR architectures and a myr­
iad of patient choice models can be engineered. Worse, where the archi­
tectures and models fail to deal with the problems we identify, the legal 
and regulatory systems that should operate as surrogates themselves 
prove to be awkward or obstructive. In the United States, records law 
and privacy-confidentiality systems encompass both state and federal 
components. The United States does not have a robust track record in 
either conceptualizing or regulating health privacy.5 Apparent federal 
solutions, such as the confidentiality regulations under the Health Insur-
5. James G. Hodge et al., Legal Issues Concerning Electronic Health Information: Privacy, 
Quality, and Liability, 282 JAMA 1466,1467^68 (1999).
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ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIP A A), are as sieve­
like as they are incomprehensible.
Medical literature, opinion polls, United Kingdom and other for­
eign EHR implementations, and our own interactions suggest that pa­
tients and physicians are skeptical about the privacy, security, and safety 
of HIT systems. Consumers are told on a daily basis that their com­
puters, when attached to networks, are pathologically insecure. Physi­
cians continue to push back on safety technologies and remain deeply 
suspicious (even resentful) of the HIPAA transactional and patient pri­
vacy constructs.6 Meanwhile, the media tirelessly report medical privacy 
horror stories of lost, stolen, or hacked records.7
A rational policymaker may view these stories as merely transi­
tional or statistically insignificant aberrations. Yet public and profes­
sional perceptions of an EHR system are far different and potentially 
corrosive. The nature of such a system is difficult to convey to the public. 
A public perception of an EHR as a governmental “big brother” is in­
creasingly likely. Take, for example, the views of the Association of 
American Physicians and Surgeons in a recent letter to Congress:
Patients will definitely not benefit from this type of program be­
cause they do not control who has access to their sensitive identifi­
able medical records in any meaningful way.. . .  [A] national health 
information system would effectively eliminate any and all patient 
consent to the release of their records by placing the records online. 
Patients would have virtually no control over who can sneak-a-peak 
at their very private and sensitive medical records.8
6. Electronic Health Records and Privacy: Hearing Before the U.S. D ep’t o f  Health and Human  
Servs. N a t’l Comm, on Vital and Health Statistics Subcomm. on Privacy, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinaf­
ter Health Records Hearing] (statement of Nicolas P. Terry).
7. See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, To H IP A A , a Son: Assessing the Technical, Conceptual, and Legal 
Frameworks fo r  Patient Safety Information, 12 W id en er L. Rev. 137 (2006); Joplin Hospital Records 
Stolen from  Company, Colum . D a ily  T rib. (Columbia, Mo.), July 25, 2005 (computers containing 
personal information of 27,000 patients stolen from microfilming company); Hawaii Warns 43,000 
Residents o f  Health Data Theft, M od. H e a l th c a r e  O n line, Apr. 14, 2006, http://www. 
moderahealthcare.com/news.cms?newsld=5039; Gary T. Kubota, Hospital Loses Patient Data, 
H o n o lu lu  S t a r  B u ll. ,  Oct. 21, 2005, at A3 (hospital lost computer drive of personal information 
implicating 130,000 patients); Todd Milboura, Stolen Laptop Contains Files on H IV  Patients, 
S a c ra m e n to  Bee, Feb. 23, 2006, at B3 (“A laptop computer containing health information for 1,764 
clients of CARES, a Sacramento HIV/AIDS clinic, was stolen during a home burglary.”); Sean 
Webby, Medical Records Theft A larm s Parents, M e rc u ry  News (San Jose, Cal.), Sept. 20,2005, at IB 
(theft of records from Palo Alto nonprofit that works with emotionally troubled and developmentally 
challenged children); Update: Thief Nabs Backup Data on 365,000 Patients, C o m p u te rw o rld , Jan. 
26, 2006, http://www.computerworld.eom/securitytopics/security/privacy/story/0,10801,108101,OO.html 
(theft of generally unencrypted computer backup data on 365,000 hospice and home healthcare pa­
tients in Oregon and Washington from employee’s care); Press Release, Providence Health Sys. in Or., 
State Finds Providence Acted Appropriately Following Theft of Computer Disks, Tapes, available at 
http://www.providence.org/oregon/hcs/newsrelease.htm.
8. Letter from Jane M. Orient, M.D., Executive Director, Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, 
to Congress (Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://www.aapsonline.org/confiden/hr4157-letter.php; see also 
Press Release, Institute for Health Freedom, Congress Could Vote Soon on a Bill that Abolishes State 
Health-Privacy Rights (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.forhealthfreedom.org/Publications/ 
Privacy/ ActNowHR4157.html.
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This article is premised on the end of one important phase in the 
development of a national electronic interoperable health records 
(EIHR) system: the satisfactory near completion of the technical specifi­
cations for infrastructure and data exchange.9 As this “insider baseball” 
phase concludes, the “outside” stakeholders must be identified and satis­
fied. For a national EIHR system, cost10 and lack of confidentiality are 
the two potential deal-breakers. This article addresses the second of 
these: the question of whether such an ambitious EIHR system can oper­
ate within a framework of ethically and practically satisfactory confiden­
tiality, privacy, and security protections. Here, we analyze the possible 
EHR architectures and compare their implications for confidentiality, 
privacy, and security. Similarly, we examine the possible models of pa­
tient choice that can be integrated into such systems. Finally, we discuss 
what legal and regulatory steps will be required to provide privacy and 
confidentiality protections.
II. T h e  R o a d  t o  In t e r o p e r a b l e  H e a l t h  R e c o r d s
A. Technologies and Terminology
The HIT movement assaults us with a bewildering array of termi­
nology expressed in “insider” acronyms.11 Records technologies have 
their own confusing labels. In this article, we discuss several electronic 
records technologies. The most generalized label is EMR, which de­
scribes any form of computerized record-keeping, from a modest soft­
ware package used in a single doctor’s office to an enterprisewide, data­
base-driven application. Primarily, however, this article concerns the 
EHR, a type of EMR architecture that permits the sharing of patient 
data among healthcare providers.
Some EHRs are conceptually and technically quite simple. For ex­
ample, the personal EHR (PHR) is a database of medical information 
that is collected and maintained by the individual patient.12 However, 
the EHR label is most often applied to far more complex systems that
9. See, e.g., Consolidated Health Informatics (CHI) Initiative; Health Care and Vocabulary 
Standards for Use in Federal Health Information Technology Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. 76,287 (Dec. 23, 
2005); FD A Selects SN O M E D  fo r  D rug Labels, G o v 't  H e a l th  IT, Apr. 21, 2006, available at 
http://govhealthit.com/article94147-04-21-06-Web. See generally E le c . H e a l th  R e c o rd  V en d o rs  
Ass’n (EHRVA), EHRVA I n te r o p e r a b i l i ty  R oadm ap V ersion  2.0 (2006), 
http://www.himssehrva.org/docs/roadmap_v2.pdf.
10. For a summary of some of the financial issues, see infra text accompanying note 20.
11. Examples include Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), Computerized Order Entry ap­
pliances (CPOEs), and Clinical Decision-Support Systems (CDSS). See generally Terry, supra note 7.
12. E.g., CapMed’s Personal Health Record, http://www.capmed.com/products.html; iHealthRe- 
cord, http://www.ihealthrecord.org/; MyMedicalRecords.com, http://www.MyMedicalRecords.com. 
See generally Julie Appleby, D o n ’t Let Hurricanes Blow Your Medical Records A w ay, USA T o d ay , 
Oct. 27, 2005, at B l (“Backers of direct-to-consumer online medical records say their services will gain 
ground, spurred by concern about record losses in disasters, the desire by consumers for more ease in 
moving medical records from one doctor to another and by the growing push to create a more digi­
tized medical system.”).
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rely on technical interoperability between diverse electronic records sys­
tems. The federal government is primarily interested in a fully interop­
erable, longitudinal records system that will initially operate on regional 
networks (Regional Health Information Organizations, or RHIOs) be­
fore transitioning to a National Health Information Network (NHIN).13 
Due to scale and architecture, these models reduce or eliminate patient 
involvement in the sharing process.
B. The Bush Administration’s EIHR Plan
Concomitant with his 2004 announcement that most Americans 
should have electronic health records within the next ten years, President 
Bush appointed Dr. David Brailer to a new post of National Health In­
formation Technology Coordinator (ONCHIT) to guide the “nationwide 
implementation of interoperable health information technology.”14 
ONCHIT has built on the previous work of NCVHS15 and the Consoli­
dated Health Informatics (CHI) Initiative16 and oversees the Federal 
Health Architecture.17
The Bush administration publicly eschews any regulatory mandate 
directing healthcare providers to adopt F.HRs.' Rather, it espouses 
EHR adoption via “a smooth market-led way.”19 Of course, with no gov­
ernment-funded mandate, there remain significant technical, cultural, 
and, particularly, financial20 barriers to EHR adoption in addition to the
13. See generally H.R. 4859,109th Cong. (2004); H.R. 4157,109th Cong. (2004).
14. Exec. Order No. 13,335,69 Fed. Reg. 24,059, § 3 (Apr. 30,2004).
15. U.S. D ep’t of Health & Human Servs., National Committee on Vital Health Statistics, 
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov (last visited Oct. 15,2006).
16. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Office of the National Coordinator for Health Infor­
mation Technology, http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/chiinitiative.html (last visited Jan. 3,2007).
17. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Federal Health Architecture (FHA), http://www. 
hhs.gov/fedhealtharch (last visited Jan. 3, 2007) (“The FHA is managed within the Office of the Na­
tional Coordination for Health I T . . . . ”).
18. Chris Murphy & Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, Industry M ust Im prove Its Technology, 
In fo rm a tio n  W eek, June 21, 2004, at 30 (“I don’t want to see a Son of HIPAA put into law.” (quot­
ing David Brailer, Coordinator, Nat’l Healthcare Info. Tech., Speech to the National Alliance for 
Health Information Technology)).
19. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Secretary Leavitt Takes N ew  Steps to 
Advance Health I T  (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.os.dhhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/ 
20050606.html.
20. The core issue is the misalignment of incentives such that, basically, there is an inverse rela­
tionship between those required to invest in EMR/EHR and those who would benefit. See Joan S. 
Ash & David W. Bates, Position Paper, Factors and Forces A ffecting E H R  System Adoption: Report o f  
a 2004 A C M I Discussion, 12 J. Am. Med. In form . Ass’n 8, 10 (2005), available at http://www.jamia. 
org/cgi/reprint/12/1/8; Michael W. Bender, Ahmed H. Mitwalli, & Steven J. Van Kuiken, W hat’s H old­
ing Back Online Medical Data, M cKinsey Q., Dec. 2005, http://mckinseyquarterly.com/article_print. 
aspx?L2=12&L3=63&ar=1699; Terry, supra note 7, at 173-84; see also Nancy Ferris, Doctors Want 
Payment Boost fo r  Using e-Health Records, Gov’t Health IT, Jan. 31, 2006, available at 
http://govhealthit.com/article92155-01-31-06-Web (detailing American College of Physicians’ call for 
Medicare to reimburse primary care physicians for using EHRs); Christopher Rowland, Digital Divide 
Widens in Medicine: Computerized Records Im prove Care but Som e Doctors Can’t A ffo rd  It, B oston  
G lo b e , Feb. 10, 2006, at Cl, available at http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2006/ 
02/10/digital_divide_widens_in_medidne/?page=full.
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confidentiality-privacy issues raised in this article.21 Notwithstanding, 
ONCHIT and its supporters have moved inextricably towards the most 
complex, professionally disruptive, and, at $400 billion,22 the most expen­
sive EHR architecture.23 Current ONCHIT request for proposals (RFPs) 
address technical standards, the certification of EMR systems (to guaran­
tee interoperability), and most crucially, prototyping an internet-based 
NHIN architecture.24 Not surprisingly, a NHIN (or multiple RHIO) ar­
chitecture also provides the greatest challenge to protecting patient con­
fidentiality, privacy, and security.
C. Alternative Models
Although the administration has not entered into a public debate 
over its preferred EHR architecture, there are several alternatives to a 
fully interoperable electronic record either in use or under development 
in the United States and further afield. Some of these architectures have 
different confidentiality and privacy implications, though they may also 
lack some of the error-reduction and outcomes research benefits of a na­
tional EIHR.
/. United States
Within the United States, two major alternatives to a fully interop­
erable EHR architecture have emerged: Continuity of Care Records and 
Personal EHRs. The Continuity of Care Record (CCR) is an effort to 
standardize electronic records to ease portability.25 A specification de­
veloped by the Health Information Management and Systems Society 
(HIMSS) and various professional bodies,26 CCR aims to extract data 
from existing proprietary EMR systems and export it to a common text
21. See discussion infra Pari lll.B.
22. Rainu Kaushal et al., The Costs o f  a National Health Information Network, 143 A n n a ls  o f  
I n t e r n a l  M edicine 165, 165 (2005). In contrast to the expected costs, the 2007 proposed federal 
budget contains $116 million for the Office of the National Coordinator, $50 million for the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality, and $3 million for the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation. See O ffice  o f  Mgmt. a n d  B u d g e t, B u d g e t  o f  t h e  U n ited  S ta te s  
G o v ern m en t: F is c a l  Y e a r  2007, at 109 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/ 
fy2007/pdf/budget/hhs.pdf.
23. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Thompson Launches 
“Decade of Health Information Technology” (July 21, 2004), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/ 
20040721a.html (explaining the general parameters of the federal HER plan).
24. Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
25. The current specification is E2369-05, Standard Specification for Continuity of Care Record 
(CCR). See ASTM International, http://www.astm.org/cgi-bin/SoftCart.exe/DATEBASE.CART. 
REDLINE_PAGES/E2369.htm?L+mystore+jjfs9503 (last visited Oct. 10, 2006); see also AAFP’s Cen­
ter for Health Information Technology, Essential Similarities and Differences Between the HL7 
C.DA/CRS and ASTM CCR, http://www.centerforhit.org/PreBuilt/chit_ccrhl7.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 
2007).
26. See Medical Records Institute, Continuity of Care Record (CCR), http://www.medrecinst. 
com/pages/about.asp?id=54 (last visited Jan. 3,2007).
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export format (XML27), which would allow portability of summary data28 
and enable it to be given to a patient or transferred directly to the pa­
tient’s next provider.29
A PHR is a personal database of medical information that is col­
lected and maintained by the patient, who controls whether and to what 
extent it is shared with providers.30 PHRs are supplied free by, for ex­
ample, employers or healthcare providers on a subscription basis. They 
may be web-based or databases created on the patient’s own computer. 
Recently, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a 
request for information (RFI) seeking input on how best it should make 
data about Medicare beneficiaries available for incorporation into such 
personal EHRs.31
2. Outside the United States
National or regional EIHRs are also gaining attention in the health­
care systems of other developed countries. For example, in Canada, 
Infoway, a nonprofit partnership of federal, provincial, and territorial 
governments, is coordinating the deployment of a pan-Canadian EHR.32 
Currently, Infoway is emphasizing the development of technical interop­
erability standards.33 New Zealand has announced a wide-ranging 
Health Information Strategy that includes interoperable EHR event 
summaries that can be distributed at local, regional, and national levels.34 
New Zealand has decided not to create a national EHR database.35 The 
most advanced EIHR projects, however, are in the United Kingdom and 
Australia.
In 1998, the United Kingdom commenced an ambitious and costly 
information technology-based makeover of its entire healthcare system. 
This National Programme fo r IT in the NHS (NPfIT) involved the in-
27. See generally World Wide Web Consortium, Extensible Markup Language (XML), 
http://www.w3.org/XML/ (last visited Oct. 3,2006).
28. Medical Records Institute, supra note 26.
29. See David C. Kibbe et al., The Continuity o f  Care Record , 70 Am. Fam. Physic ian  1220, 
1222 (2004).
30. Tracy D. Gunter & Nicolas P. Terry, The Emergence o f  National Electronic Health Record 
Architectures in the United States and Australia: Models, Costs, and Questions, J. Med. I n t e r n e t  Res., 
Jan.-Mar. 2005, available at http://www.jmir.org/2005/l/e3; see e.g., CapMed’s Personal Health Record, 
supra note 12; iHealthRecord, supra note 12. See generally Laura Landro, High-Tech Tools Help Pa­
tients Manage Own Medical Records, D e s e re t  News (Salt Lake City, Utah), Feb. 28,2005, at Cl.
31. Federal Business Opportunities, Synopsis of Request for information-Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services’ Role in Personal Health Records (July 18, 2005), http://www.fbo.gov/servlet/ 
Documents/R/1233397.
32. Canada Health Infoway, Overview, http://www.infoway-inforoute.ca/en/WhatWeDo/ 
Overview.aspx (last visited Jan. 3,2007).
33. Canada Health Infoway, Infoway Standards Collaboration Process, http://www.infoway- 
inforoute.ca/en/WhatWeDo/StandardsCollaboration.aspx (last visited Oct. 3,2006).
34. New Z e a la n d  M in is try  o f  H e a l th ,  H e a l th  In fo rm a tio n  S t r a te g y  f o r  New 
Z e a la n d  2005 (2005), available at http://www.moh. govt, nz/moh.nsf/0/ 
1912064EEFEC8EBCCC2570430003DADl/$File/health-information-strategy.pdf.
35. See id.
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vestment of some $11.1 billion over a ten-year program.36 The NHS In­
formation Authority originally led the United Kingdom program, but af­
ter critical reviews, it was renamed NHS Connecting fo r Health37 and is 
now directly overseen by the Department of Health.38 A key component 
of the U.K. program is the NHS Care Records Service (NHS CRS), 
which aims to provide an electronic NHS Care Record for all U.K. pa­
tients. Although the first fully electronic transfer of a patient record be­
tween doctors’ offices occurred in November 2005,39 organizational, cul­
tural, and financial woes have slowed considerably the EHR program in 
the United Kingdom.40 Both providers and patients have seriously criti­
cized the EHR program because of privacy and security concerns.41
The Australian HealthConnect system has completed its initial tri­
als, but recent funding problems and questions about privacy and con­
sent issues have slowed progress.42 These delays have occurred despite 
the fact that the HealthConnect model supports a robust health confiden- 
tiality-privacy system43 by both pushing only “event summaries” to the 
centralized EIHR and providing for considerable patient data carveouts 
designed to keep certain data within patient control.44
First, HealthConnect does not create a true longitudinal record, but 
aggregates elements extracted from a patient’s existing EMR(s).45 These 
event summaries are defined as “an electronic overview of a visit to a 
doctor or hospital, or some other health care event. . .  containing] only
36. See Editorial, National Programme for Information Technology Is Sorely Needed and Must 
S u ccee d -b u t Is o f f  to a Shaky Start, 328 BMJ 1145,1145 (2004).
37. History of Our Organisation—NHS Connecting for Health, http://www.connectingforhealth. 
nhs.uk/about/history (last visited Nov. 10,2006).
38. I d
39. NHS Connecting for Health Completes Transfer of a Patient’s Medical Record, eGov 
Monitor, Nov. 8,2005, http://www.egovmonitor.com/node/3454 (last visited Oct. 12,2006).
40. See Jane Hendy et al, Challenges to Implementing the National Programme for Information 
Technology (NPfIT): A  Qualitative Study, 331 BMJ 331, 332-34 (2005); see also Brian Robinson, U.K. 
Lacks Support for Health I T  M odernization, G ov’t  H e a l th  IT, Jan. 12,2006, available at http://www. 
govhealthit.com/article91953-01-12-06-Web (reporting that nearly 70% of the doctors surveyed said 
they would have insufficient funds to properly implement NPfIT, while only 30% of doctors view the 
program an important priority for the NHS); Nicholas Timmins, N H S and Suppliers Struggle With Ba­
sics on Patient Record System, Fin. Times UK, Nov. 1,2006, available at 2006 WLNR 18981715.
41. See Call fo r  Review o f  N H S I T  Upgrade, BBC News, Apr. 10, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
l/hi/health/4896198.stm; GPs Fret over Online Records, Times (London), June 7,2005, Public Agenda, 
at 6; Alice Miles, The Spy in the G P ’s Surgery, Times (London), Jan. 12, 2005, at 18; Helene Mulhold- 
land, N H S Set to Miss e-Booking Target, G u a rd ia n  U n lim ited , Sept. 30, 2005, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/uknews/story/0,16559,1582117,00.html; Nicholas Timmins, D octors’ Debate Delays Pa­
tient Record, Fin. Times UK, Apr. 27, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 7068306 (describing additional 
delays as doctors favor opt-in model); Nick Triggle, Confidentiality Fear over Records, BBC News, 
June 29, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/health/4633213.stm; see also infra text accompanying note 
272.
42. Karen Dearne, Feds’ Health Data Project Stalls, A u s tr a l ia n ,  June 7,2005, at 29.
43. See Australian Government, Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Health, http://www. 
privacy.gov.au/health/index.html (last visited Jan. 3,2007).
44. Nicolas P. Terry, Electronic Health Records: International, Structural and Legal Perspectives, 
12 J.L. & Med. 26,33 (2004).
45. Id. at 32-33.
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the information that is relevant to the future health and care of the con­
sumer, rather than the comprehensive notes that a doctor may 
keep . . .  ,”46 Additionally, HealthConnect utilizes a “push” model, 
whereby data is sent from the local EMR to a centralized HealthConnect 
record, in contrast to the proposed U.S. EIHR model that seems likely to 
adopt a “pull” model, whereby the centralized system initiates a data re­
quest from a provider’s record using a data pointer.47 Finally, Health­
Connect not only creates an event summary that is less than a complete 
record, but it also allows the patient (in consultation with the physician) 
to control what data are included and who may view it.48
Because of an apparent reduction in Commonwealth (federal) fund­
ing, HealthConnect may evolve into a decentralized49 and less F.HR- 
centric project.50 While many Australian patients and physicians have 
articulated a preference for simple consent models such as a generalized 
“opt-in” and prospective consent for the pushing of their data to the cen­
tralized HealthConnect summary record, many remain uncomfortable 
with any participation in the system.51
3. RHIOs a n d  the NHIN
ONCHIT is publicly encouraging and, to an extent, incentivizing 
RHIOs while at the same time designing a NHIN.52 The fundamental 
feature of both RHIOs and a NHIN is that they are not intrinsically elec­
tronic records, but networking infrastructures that facilitate interconnec­
tivity between existing systems.53 As such, these systems are premised 
not only on the widespread deployment of EMR and EHR systems in 
medical offices, hospitals, and hospital systems, but also on the ability of
46. HealthConnect, Event Summaries, http://www.health.gov.au/internet/hconnect/publishing. 
nsf/Content/event-summaries (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
47. HealthConnect, Privacy, http://www.health.gov.au/internet/hconnect/publishing.nsf/Content/ 
privacy (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Karen Deame, Seniors Corralled for Pilot, A u s tr a l ia n  IT, Mar. 23, 2006 (on file 
with author) (detailing New South Wales’ Health’s “shaky start” to trial of a HealthConnect-style 
electronic record pilot, Healthelink, using an automatic enrollment, opt-out model).
50. See generally HealthConnect Implementation Strategy, Version 2.0 (rev.), June 2005, 
http://www.healthconnect.gov.au/pdf/implementation.pdf.
51. C om m onw ealth  o f  A u s tl., Lessons L e a rn e d  fro m  th e  Me d iCo n n e c t  F ie ld  T es t 
a n d  H ealth C o aw ec? ’ T r ia l s  8 (2005), available at http://www.health.gov.au/internet/hconnect/ 
publishing.nsf/Content/key-reports (follow “Lessons Learned form the MediConnect Field Test and 
YLedXihConnect Trials 1-10” hyperlink).
52. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Awards Contracts to 
Develop Nationwide Health Information Network (Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
news/press/2005pres/20051110.html.
53. The NHIN concept may grow closer to a national EHR if it utilizes a centralized data ware­
house rather than a pointer system, it is, however, unlikely that the federal government would be pre­
pared to finance such a centralized model.
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those deployed local systems to interconnect with the network. Neither 
of those predicates is true.54
Even leaving aside the cultural, professional, legal,55 and financial 
disincentives to electronic records, interoperable systems face something 
of a catch-22: RHIOs and the NHIN cannot be built without local EMR 
or EHR systems, but providers are hesitant to commit to local systems 
without knowing the RHIO or NHIN to which they may connect. Pro­
viders considering involvement in a RHIO additionally face the question 
of what will happen to their RHIO if, subsequently, a NHIN is con­
structed.56
III. W e ig h in g  t h e  C o s t s  a n d  B e n e f it s
Many potential benefits of interconnected EHRs seem easily meas­
urable: improved continuity of care, reduced frequency of errors in 
medication and treatment, and increased potential for outcomes research 
and public health surveillance.57 Beyond implementation costs, other 
costs are more intangible: privacy, confidentiality, and security risks; and 
concerns about the behavior of patients who, wary of the implications of 
electronic records, attempt to keep their records, or even themselves, out 
of the healthcare system altogether. These costs are significant, and ad­
dressing them by system design at the outset may be necessary to gener­
ate the trust in networked EHRs that will enable achievement of their 
very substantial benefits. If, for example, concerns about security risks 
result in an architecture that does not permit records to be searchable as 
part of a common database, opportunities for performance evaluation, 
outcomes research, and public health surveillance will be lost.58
A. Benefits and Drivers
“At its most sophisticated or most infused level, the EHR becomes 
a hub of all activity, something that permeates every element of the
54. See, e.g., Ford ei al., Predicting the A doption o f  Electronic Health Records by Physicians: 
When Will Health Care be Paperless?, 13 J. Am. Med. In fo rm a tic s  Ass’n 106, 108-10 (2006) (con­
cluding ihai universal EMR/EHR adoption will not be met by 2014 and suggesting a conservative es­
timate that 86.6% of physicians in small practices will be using EHRs in 2024).
55. See generally Terry, supra note 7, at 160.
56. .See Joseph Goedert, A re R H IO s fo r  Real?, H e a l th  D a ta  Mgmt., Feb. 6,2006, at 44,45.
57. See, e.g., RAND Corp., H e a l th  In fo rm a tio n  T ec h n o lo g y : Can HIT L o w er C osts 
a n d  Im prove Q u a lity ?  (2005), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9136/RAND_RB9136. 
pdf.
58. For a summary of these benefits, costs, and strategies, see Letter Report from Simon P. 
Cohn, Chairman, Nat’l Comm, on Vital and Health Statistics, to Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 9, 2005), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/509091t.htm. 
For a discussion of the tensions concerning privacy, security, and proprietary information in system 
design, see Kenneth D. Mandl, Peter Szolovits & Isaac S. Kohane, Public Standards and Patients’ Con­
trol: How to Keep Electronic Medical Records Accessible but Private, 322 BMJ 283 (2001).
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workflow and of work life.”59 Although this characterization is some­
what hyperbolic, a comprehensive, longitudinal EHR ideally will: (1) in­
terconnect with and enhance other error-reducing and cost-saving tech­
nologies such as decision support systems; (2) streamline healthcare 
dataflow using an interoperable and standardized nomenclature; (3) im­
prove quality of care by encouraging accurate, timely, and legible com­
munication among providers; (4) automate adverse event and medical 
error disclosure; and (5) facilitate reliable and reproducible outcomes re­
search and reporting, as well as other public health initiatives.60
One of the most discussed benefits of EHRs is the potential for er­
ror reduction. Tn an electronic format, data are legible, thus minimizing 
the risks of pharmacists misreading handwriting on prescriptions or sub­
sequent providers struggling to decipher records of earlier treatment. 
Data are also directly transferable, thus avoiding transcription errors and 
delays in recording prescriptions or test results communicated by tele­
phone.61 Functions can be written to flag prior allergic reactions, drug 
interactions, or other contraindications for contemplated therapy, thus 
additionally reducing the potential for error.62 Computerized provider 
order entry systems (CPOEs) linked to EHRs may reduce the incidence 
of medication errors.63 These apparent advantages, however, are not un- 
controversial; there may be risks of additional adverse events, particu­
larly as electronic systems are introduced, and there is much discussion in 
the literature about how to reduce unanticipated errors due to hu­
man/technology interfaces.64
59. See Ash & Bales, supra note 20.
60. Gunier & Terry, supra note 30.
61. Jan Walker ei al., The Value o f  Health Care Information Exchange and Interoperability, 
H e a l th  A ff. (Jan. 19,2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthafi:.w5.10vl.pdf.
62. E.g. Nadir R. Shah et al., Im proving Acceptance o f  Computerized Prescribing Alerts in A m ­
bulatory Care, 13 J. Am. M ed. Info . Ass’n 5, 5 (2006); Robyn Tamblyn, Im proving Patient Safety 
Through Computerized Drug Management: The Devil Is in the Details, 5 H e a l th c a r e  P ap e rs  52, 54­
56 (2004). For a discussion of the error-reduction potential of EHRs, see David A. Hyman & Charles 
Silver, The Poor State o f  Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part o f  the Problem  
or Part o f  the Solution ?, 90 C o r n e l l  L. Rev. 893 (2005). For an overview of the potential cost effec­
tiveness of electronic records systems, see Sarah Klein, Issue o f  the Month: W ho Has $400 Billion to 
Build a National Health Information Network?, Q u a l i ty  M a t te r s :  Sep tem ber U p d a te  fro m  th e  
C om m onw ealth  F und, Sept. 2005, available at http://www.cmwf.org/publications/publications_show. 
htm?doc_id=294918. The Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative and the Massachusetts Medical Soci­
ety have just begun a demonstration of the use of EHRs in the offices of physicians. Press Release, 
Mass. e-Health Collaborative, Massachusetts Takes a Giant Step Towards Electronic Health Records 
(Oct. 5, 2005), available at http://www.maehc.org/documents/HIMMSE~HEALTHfinaL000. 
pdf. Many healthcare systems have significant experience with electronic records, including the Vet­
erans Health Administration, the New England Healthcare Electronic Data Interchange Network, the 
Indiana Network for Patient Care, the Santa Barbara County Care Data Exchange, the Patient Safety 
Institute’s National Benefit Trust Network, and the Markle Foundation’s Healthcare Collaborative 
Network, Kelsey D. Patterson, Healing Health Care: Fixing a Broken System with Information Tech­
nology, 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. P o l ’y 193, 200 (2004).
63. Anne Bobb et al., The Epidemiology o f  Prescribing Errors: The Potential Impact o f  Comput­
erized Prescriber Order Entry, 164 A rc h iv es  I n t e r n a l  M ed. 785, 789-90 (2004).
64. E.g., Margaret Caudill-Slosberg & William B. Weeks, Case Study: Identifying Potential Prob­
lems at the H um an/Technical Interface in Complex Clinical Systems, 20 Am. J. Med. Q u a l i ty  353
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An electronic format also permits entries in patients’ records to be 
checked against programmed guidelines and clinical decision support sys­
tems, prompting providers if prescription amounts are out of range, if 
necessary data have been omitted in the record, or if recommended pro­
cedures have not been performed.65 Here, too, there is some dispute 
about whether use of these support systems will improve outcomes for 
patients.66
To be sure, these benefits depend on accurate data entry into the 
electronic record, but even here, electronic records may have advantages 
over paper records. Some data, such as laboratory test results or digi­
tized scans, can be entered into a record automatically. Software moni­
toring electronic records can be programmed to flag unusual or inconsis­
tent entries, from a blood pressure or prostrate-specific antigen (PSA) 
reading much higher or lower than before, to a shift in noted patterns of 
calcification in a mammography reading.67 Patients who have access to 
their EHRs, which are more easily transmitted and more portable than 
paper copies, can also check them for accuracy, just as they can perform 
online reviews of credit card or banking statements.
Other potential advantages of electronic records in patient care are 
patient education and communication. Physicians or patients can use 
electronic records to graph progress in easily visualized ways.68 Elec­
tronic record systems can be programmed to send patients e-mail re­
minders for follow-up care. Electronically generated letters or e-mails 
can be used to contact patients if new and relevant information becomes
(2005); Yong Y. Han el al., Unexpected Increased Mortality A  fter Implementation o f  a Commercially 
Sold Computerized Physician Order Entry System , 116 P e d ia t r ic s  1506 (2005); Ross Koppel el al., 
Role o f  Computerized Physician Order Entry Systems in Facilitating Medication Errors, 293 JAMA 
1197 (2005); Jonalhon R. Nebeker el al., High Rates o f  Adverse Drug Events in a H ighly Computerized  
Hospital, 165 A rc h iv es  I n t e r n a l  Med. 1111 (2005). For a response, see Press Release, The Leap­
frog Group, Leapfrog Responds lo Universily of Pennsylvania Sludy on CPOE Errors (Mar. 10,2005), 
available at http://www.leapfroggroup.org/media/file/Leapfrog_on_UPenn. CPOE_sludy.pdf.
65. E.g., Vahid Ebrahiminia el al., Representing the Patient’s Therapeutic History in Medical R e­
cords and in Guideline Recommendations for Chronic Diseases Using a Unique M odel, 116 S tijd . 
H e a l th  Tech. In fo rm a tic s  101 (2005) (diabeles managemenl); Sleven Omslein el al., A  M ul­
timethod Quality Im provem ent Intervention to Im prove Preventive Cardiovascular Care: A  Cluster 
R andom ized Trial, 141 Med. 523 (2005) (qualily indicators for cardiac disease prevenlion); Mallhew 
H. Samore el al., Clinical Decision Support and Appropriateness o f  Antim icrobial Prescribing: A  R an­
dom ized Trial, 294 JAMA 2305 (2005) (finding significanl decline in anlibiolic prescriptions for upper 
respiratory infections in communities using CDSS system).
66. William M. Tierney el al., Can Computer-Generated Evidence-Based Care Suggestions E n­
hance Evidence-Based Management o f  A sthm a and Chronic Obstructive Pulm onary Disease? A  R an­
domized, Controlled Trial, 40 H e a l th  S erv ices Res. 477, 477 (2005) (finding no relation between 
care prompts and patient management in a randomized trial of electronic care prompts in asthma pa­
tients).
67. For a discussion of these benefits in the VistA system developed by the Veteran Health Ad­
ministration, see Jonathan B. Perlin et al., The Veterans Health Administration: Quality, Value, A c ­
countability, and Information as Transforming Strategies for Patient-Centered Care, Am. J. M an ag ed  
C a re , Nov. 2004, at 828,832^36.
68. See Douglas McCarthy, Case Study: Frontline Physicians and Their Patients Reap Benefits 
from EH Rs, Q u a l i ty  M a t te r s :  Sep tem ber U p d a te  fro m  th e  C om m onw ealth  Fund, Sept. 
2005, htlp://www.cmwf.org/publicalions/publicalions_show.htm?doc_id=294918#casesludy.
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available, if they are overdue for an appointment, or if medications are 
withdrawn from the market.69 The advantages and disadvantages of pro­
vider-patient e-mail contact and web-based communication are increas­
ingly discussed in the medical practice literature.70 Perhaps more contro­
versially, patients themselves use the web with increasing frequency to 
learn about health conditions, therapeutic alternatives, and care provid­
ers specializing in their conditions. Armed with their own EHRs, and 
guided by their physicians, patients may be able to make more informed 
use of this resource.71
Leaving aside the potential for the improvement of care at the level 
of the individual patient, several forces relating to healthcare delivery 
currently drive the U.S. interest in a national system of interoperable 
electronic records.72 First, major shifts in care venues have accelerated 
the need for efficient flow of patient medical and billing information be­
tween organizationally and geographically distinct providers. Patients 
now are more likely to receive care in ambulatory care rather than in­
patient settings. They are geographically mobile and also tend to change 
providers as their insurance or preferences change. If test results from 
prior treatment are readily available in an accurate and secure format, 
patients may avoid the inconvenience, risk, and expense of reduplicative 
testing that occurs when they see new providers who are unsure about 
reports of prior medical evaluations.73
Second, the operational aspects of managed care have increased the 
need for data transparency.74 “Gate keeping” physicians who authorize 
referrals, third party payers who want pay-for-performance “report 
cards,” and system administrators who need sophisticated utilization re­
view and risk management tools all are served by electronic record sets.
69. For a description of some of these uses of EHRs in a primary care practice, see Richard J. 
Baron et al., Electronic Health Records: Just A round  the Comer? O r Just over the C liff?, 143 A n n a ls  
I n t e r n a l  M ed. 222 (2005).
70. E.g., Felicity Goodyear-Smith et al., Pandora’s Electronic Box: GPs Reflect upon Email 
Communication with Their Patients, 13 In fo rm a tic s  P r im a ry  C a re  195 (2005); Steven J. Katz & 
Cheryl A. Moyer, The Emerging Role o f  Online Communication Between Patients and Their Providers, 
19 J. Gen. I n t e r n a l  M ed. 978 (2004); Stephen E. Ross et al., Providing a Web-Based Online Medical 
Record with Electronic Communication Capabilities to Patients with Congestive Heart Failure: Ran­
dom ized Trial, 6 J. Med. I n t e r n e t  Res., Apr.-June 2004, available at http://www.jmir.Org/2004/2/el2/.
71. Alejandro (Alex) R. Jadad, What Will It Take to Bring the Internet into the Consulting Room: 
We Cannot Remain Oblivious to O ur Patients’ Expectations, 20 J. Gen. I n t e r n a l  Med. 787, 787 
(2005); S. H. Woolf et al., Promoting Inform ed Choice: Transforming Health Care to Dispense K now l­
edge for Decision M aking, 143 A n n a ls  I n t e r n a l  Med. 293,295 (2005).
72. Terry, supra note 44, at 28-29.
73. One estimate puts these costs of repeat testing at 15% of system costs. M a rk le  F o u n d a ­
t io n , Linking H e a l th  C a re  In fo rm a tio n : P ro p o sed  M e th o d s  f o r  Im proving C a re  a n d  
P r o te c t in g  P r iv a c y  3 (2005), http://www.connectingforhealth.org/assets/reports/linking_report_2_ 
2005.pdf; see also Michael Weiner et al., Using Information Technology to Im prove the Health Care o f  
Older A dults, 139 A n n a ls  I n t e r n a l  Med. 430,430 (2003).
74. Dewey Freeman, Pay fo r  Performance: A  Win fo r  the N H IN ?, 59 H e a l th c a r e  Fin. Mgmt. 
Aug. 2005, at 120,120; Paul C. Tang & W. Ed. Hammond, Commentary, A  Progress Report on C om ­
puter-Based Patient Records in the United States, in T he C om puter-B ased  P a t ie n t  R eco rd : An 
E s s e n tia l  T e c h n o lo g y  f o r  H e a l th  C a re  (Richard S. Dick et al. eds., 1997).
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Large-scale third-party payers currently use electronic data sets to com­
pare local variations in utilization and quality of care,75 a trend that can 
only be expected to continue.
Third, the growth of “shared care,” whereby the patient shares re­
sponsibility with the care provider and is likely to have increasingly epi­
sodic relationships with multiple providers, requires patients to have ac­
cess to health data generally and, more controversially, to information in 
their health records.76 Furthermore, “shared care” requires that provid­
ers have transparent access to other occasions of treatment received by 
the patient, particularly pharmacotherapy.77 Thus, “shared care” used in 
home care settings—among providers or between providers and family 
members or other means of support—may also benefit from access to 
electronic records.78
Finally, healthcare consumers and regulators are demanding in­
creasing amounts of data regarding medical errors, quality of care, and 
treatment outcomes.79 This information is difficult to generate without 
sophisticated data coding and nearly impossible to analyze without com­
plex database systems. The Health Plan Employer Data and Informa­
tion Set (HEDIS) measures,80 for example, are more accurate if they are 
based on chart reviews rather than billing records, but it is expensive and 
cumbersome to examine paper charts.81 With electronic records, it is far 
simpler to get an accurate picture of the extent to which providers are 
meeting performance indicators.
Beyond improved coordination of patient care and outcomes meas­
urement, electronic record data sets may serve critical public health 
goals. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have noted the 
likely usefulness of such records in monitoring immunization rates and
75. See Leonard D. Schaeffer & Dana E. McMuriry, Perspective: Variation in Medical Care: 
Time for A ction , H e a l th  A ff. (Nov. 16, 2005), hiip://conieni.healihaffairs.org/cgi/conieni/absiraci/ 
hlthaff.w5.552vl (follow link to PDF or HTML version of article).
76. See, e.g., Jem Rashbass, Siudeni JAMA, The Patient-Owned, Population-Based Electronic 
Medical Record: A  Revolutionary Resource for Clinical Medicine, 285 JAMA 1769 (2001); Chrisiopher 
C. Tsai & Jusiin Siarren, Siudeni JAMA, Patient Participation in Electronic Medical Records, 285 
JAMA 1765 (2001).
77. See, e.g., T re e n a  A. Chomik, P ro v in c ia l  H e a l th  S erv ices A u th o r i ty ,  A R e p o r t  on 
S h a re d  C a re  40-41 (2005), available at http://www.phsa.ca/NR/rdonleyres/76D687CF_6596_46FE_ 
AA9A_A536D61FB038/12130/SharedCareReportAug2005.pdf (listing pharmacotherapy as part of a 
system guideline that would “facilitate the implementation of shared care”).
78. Maria Hagglund el al., Integration Architecture o f  a Mobile Virtual Health Record for Shared 
Hom e Care, 116 S tud . H e a l th  Tech. In fo rm a tic s  340,340-41 (2005).
79. See, e.g., Laura Landro, Consumers Need Health-Care Data, W a l l  St. J., Jan. 29, 2004, al
D3.
80. “HEDIS is a set of standardized performance measures designed lo ensure that purchasers 
and consumers have the information they need lo reliably compare the performance of managed 
health care plans.” National Committee for Quality Assistance, The Health Plan Employer Data and 
Information Set (HEDIS) (2006), http://www.ncqa.org/Programs/HEDIS.
81. Developed by the National Committee for Quality Assurance, HEDIS measures are stan­
dard comparisons of the performance of managed care plans. See id.
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supporting efforts to contain outbreaks.82 Electronic records can gener­
ate and automatically transmit state-mandated reports such as diagnoses 
of infectious diseases or prescriptions of controlled substances. They 
may also help in detecting patterns of disease outbreaks.83 Related ar­
guments have been made in the wake of Hurricane Katrina that EHRs 
are necessary to better facilitate disaster relief.84 If EHR architecture is 
designed to facilitate anonymized data sets, these goals can be furthered 
consistently with the privacy, confidentiality, and security protections we 
defend in this article.
B. Patient Concerns and Perceptions
Patients cite privacy, together with security, as their issues of great­
est concern about electronic records.85 The International Medical Infor­
matics Association lists patient privacy (and confidentiality) as a core 
ethical principle: “All persons have a fundamental right to privacy, and 
hence to control over the collection, storage, access, use, communication, 
manipulation and disposition of data about themselves.”86 Data from 
several recent surveys indicate that privacy protection remains highly sa­
lient for patients—and that this salience may be even greater among pa­
tients with diagnoses of illness and among racial and ethnic minorities. 
According to a 2005 survey conducted by the California Healthcare 
Foundation, 67% of Americans are concerned about the privacy of their 
health records.87 An even greater percentage (73%) of ethnic and racial 
minority patients in the survey expressed concern about the privacy of 
health information.88 One in eight respondents reported having engaged
82. See, e.g., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Im m unization Information System Pro­
g ress-U n ited  States 2003, 54 M o rb id ity  & M o r t a l i t y  W kly. Rep. 722, 723 (2005); John W. 
Loonsk, BioSense—a National Initiative for Early Detection and Quantification o f  Public Health 
Emergencies, 53 M o rb id ity  M o r t a l i t y  W k ly  Rep. Supp. 53, 55 (2004); John W. Loonsk et al., The 
Public Health Information Network (PHIN) Preparedness Initiative, 13 J. Am. Med. In fo rm a tic s  
Ass’n 1,1 (2006)'
83. See, e.g., B. C. H. Ang et al., A n  Assessment o f  Electronically Captured Data in the Patient 
Care Enhancement System (PACES) for Syndromic Surveillance, 34 Ann. A cad . Med. S in g ap o re  
539, 540 (2005); Roger S. Magnusson, Data Linkage, Health Research and Privacy: Regulating Data 
Flows in Australia’s Health Information System, 24 Sydney L. Rev. 5, 38-42 (2002).
84. Bob Brewin, Leavitt: Katrina Demonstrates Need for e-Health Records, G ov’t  H e a l th  IT, 
Sept. 8, 2005, available at http://www.govhealthit.com/article90691-09-08-05-Web (“If there was ever a 
case for [EHRs], this disaster underscores the need.” (quoting Mike Leavitt, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs.)).
85. E.g., Laura Zurita & Christian Nohr, Patient Opinion— E H R  Assessment from the Users Per­
spective, 11 M edinfo  1333 (2004).
86. Eike-Henner W. Kluge, Security and Privacy o f  E H R  System s—Ethical, Social, and Legal 
Requirements, 96 S tud . H e a l th  Tech. In fo rm a tic s  121, 122 (2003); Int’l Med. Informatics Ass’n, 
IMIA Code of Ethics for Health Information Professionals (2002), available at http://www.imia.org/ 
English_code_of_ethics.html (adopted Oct. 4, 2002).
87. C a l. H e a l th  C a re  Found., N a t io n a l  C onsum er H e a l th  P r iv a c y  S u rv e y  2005, 
E x ec u tiv e  Sum m ary 1 (2005), available at http://www.chcf.org/documents/ihealth/ 
ConsumerPrivacy2005ExecSum.pdf.
88. Id.
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in actions to  p ro te c t th e ir  p rivacy  th a t m ight h av e  co m prom ised  th e ir  
h ea lth ca re , including  avoid ing  seeing  a physician , ask ing  a physician  to  
fudge a diagnosis, pay ing  to  k e e p  in fo rm ation  ou t o f in su rance  records, 
o r  avo id ing  m edical testing  a lto g e th e r .89 T h ese  b ehav io rs w ere  m o re  fre ­
q u e n t am ong  p a tien ts  w ith ch ron ic  d iagnoses, such as can ce r o r  d iab e ­
te s . 90 O v er h a lf  o f th e  re sp o n d en ts  su rveyed  ind ica ted  concerns ab o u t 
w h e th e r p ro v id ing  h ea lth  in fo rm ation  m ight co m p ro m ise  th e ir  em p lo y ­
m en t o r  jo b  o p p o rtu n itie s .91 This re p o rt concludes th a t p ro tec tio n  of 
d a ta  con fid en tia lity  and  secu rity  a re  critically  im p o rtan t if p a tien ts  a re  to  
tru st e lec tro n ic  reco rd s system s .92
A n o th e r  recen t su rvey  from  a g ro u p  at Joh n s H o p k in s, designed  to  
test w h e th e r special p rivacy  concerns a ttach ed  to  gene tic  in fo rm ation , 
g e n e ra te d  sim ilar find ings .93 P a tien ts  w ith several d iffe ren t d iagnoses, 
to g e th e r w ith a con tro l g ro u p  o f  well p a tien ts , w ere  su rveyed  ab o u t th e ir  
p re fe ren ces  reg ard in g  k eep in g  th e ir  h ea lth  in fo rm ation  p riv a te . 94 T h e  
su rvey  resu lts ind ica ted  th a t p a tien ts  w ith genetic  d iagnoses w ere  no 
m o re  inclined  to  k e e p  in fo rm ation  p riv a te  than  p a tien ts  w ith o th e r  d iag ­
noses, b u t revealing  genetic  d iagnoses did a p p e a r to  p u t p a tien ts  at 
g re a te r  em p lo y m en t risk th an  revealing  o th e r  d iag n o ses .95 T h e  da ta  did 
ind ica te , h ow ever, th a t th e  ex ten t to  w hich p eo p le  call them selves “p r i­
v a te ” ab o u t th e ir  h ea lth  cond itions varies w ith g en d e r (m ales m o re), race  
(A frican  A m ericans m o re ), and  d isease c o n d itio n .96 N o t u nexpec ted ly , 
p a tien ts  w ith HTV w ere  m o re  co n cern ed  to  k e e p  th e ir  d iagnosis p r i­
v a te —bu t so w ere  p a tien ts  w ith co lon  cancer, a find ing  th a t suggests th a t 
th e  in fo rm ation  p a tien ts  co n sid e r p riv a te  m ay no t be lim ited  to  p sy ch ia t­
ric and  sexual m a tte rs .97
Still o th e r  d a ta  from  th e  H o p k in s  g ro u p  ind ica te  th a t m any p a tien ts  
w ould  p re fe r  no t to  h av e  th e ir  m edical reco rd s used  in research , w ithou t 
s e p a ra te  c o n se n t . 98 T his study  a tte m p te d  to  assess the  accep tab ility  to
89. See also Pew I n t e r n e t  & Am. L ife P ro je c t ,  Exposed O nline: W hy th e  New F e d e r a l  
H e a l th  P r iv a c y  R e g u la t io n  D o e sn 't  O f fe r  M uch P ro te c t io n  To I n t e r n e t  U sers  (2001), 
available a! hllp://www.pewinlernel.org/pdfs/PlP_HPP_HeallhPriv_reporl.pdf.
90. Ca l . H ealth Care Found ., supra note 87.
91. Id.
92. The palienl search for privacy is not limited to concerns about technology. See e.g.. Single 
Hospital Rooms Rekindle Debate, Bus. F irst of Buffalo , Feb. 5, 2006, http://www.bizjournals.com/ 
buffalo/stories/2006/02/06/storyl.html (detailing conversion of semiprivate into single rooms in New 
York in response to patient demands for increased privacy).
93. Nancy E. Kass et al.. Medical Privacy and the Disclosure o f  Personal Medical Information: 
The Beliefs and Experiences o f  Those with Genetic and Other Clinical Conditions, 128A A m. J. Med . 
Genetics 261 (2004).
94. Id. at 262.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 262.
97. Id. at 264.
98. Nancy E. Kass et al.. The Use o f  Medical Records in Research: What D o Patients W a n t 31 
J.L. Med . & Ethics 429,430 (2003).
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patients of HIPAA’s" standards for waiver of consent for the use of 
medical records in research: that the research is no more than minimal 
risk, that it could not be conducted without the waiver, and that it has 
been reviewed and approved by an IRB. ” Previous reported studies 
appear schizophrenic: in one study, only 18% found the use of medical 
records in research fully acceptable, and 34% of patients found the use 
completely unacceptable; but other studies found that, when actually 
asked, overwhelming majorities of patients tended to give consent.101
The Hopkins group surveyed patients with a variety of disease di­
agnoses, many who had been involved in research studies at Hopkins. 
They found 31% willing to allow the use of their records in research if it 
would improve medical knowledge, but over half unwilling to allow the 
use of their records without consent.102 A large majority (86%) of those 
surveyed, however, would be willing to allow anonymous use of their re­
cords without consent.103 The Hopkins group concluded that patients 
should be enlisted as partners in the research enterprise, with more full 
discussion about the use of records and efforts to obtain consent in ad­
vance, even in quite general terms, for future record use.104
Finally, a 2006 survey by Harris Interactive found that 68% of re­
spondents thought that electronic medical records would improve quality 
of care by reducing the number of redundant or unnecessary tests, 60% 
thought that EMRs would reduce healthcare costs, and 55% thought that 
they would reduce medical errors.105 However, 62% of respondents con­
sidered that the use of EMRs would make it more difficult to guarantee 
patient privacy.106
C. Autonomy vs. Instrumentalism
The accepted rationale for health privacy and confidentiality is 
autonomy.107 A patient exercises his autonomy-based right of privacy 
when he shares (or declines to share) information with his healthcare 
provider or, for that matter, with anyone else. Any subsequent disclo­
sure by the provider is policed by autonomy-based confidentiality. Con­
stitutional and common law confidentiality protections suggested a
99. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Slal. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 
42 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C.).
100. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2005).
101. Kass et al., supra note 98, at 429-30. These studies indicated that willingness to give consent 
varied with treatment condition; patients being seen for mental healthcare, eye care, trauma, or gyne­
cology care were less likely to give consent.
102. Id. at 431.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 433.
105. Wall Street Journal Online/Harris Interactive Health-Care Poll, supra note 3.
106. Id.
107. Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 410 (4th 
ed. 1994).
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rights-based approach108 to legal confidentiality that paralleled the 
autonomy principle. In contrast, the modem law of medical confidence 
(particularly the federal code) does not appear to be based on an auton­
omy model but on a more limited instrumental model.
The simplest (and least corrosive) instrumental justification for 
medical confidentiality is that patients provide information to physicians 
to further their diagnosis with the correlate that physicians respect confi­
dences in order to encourage patients to disclose personal and medical 
information that will make diagnosis and treatment more effective. This 
instrumental approach becomes dangerous when applied to institutional 
or industrial models of care. In such models, the notion too easily falls 
prey to arguments that see the generation, dispersal, and processing of 
longitudinal patient health information primarily as a necessity to reduce 
overall healthcare costs and to minimize medical error. As the context 
changes, therefore, the simple and innocuous instrumental approach be­
comes increasingly problematic.109
This movement to an instrumental rationale for protecting patient 
information was exacerbated by HIPAA. Congress adopted what was 
promulgated as the HIPAA-EDI110 model of health transactions to re­
duce the “back-end,” transactional costs of healthcare delivery.111 The 
concomitant HIPAA federal confidentiality code112 was enacted to 
minimize objections to and maximize participation in a transactional 
model desired by industry and promoted by government. As chillingly 
confirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Citizens for Health v. 
Leavitt ™ the federal standards have gutted the nascent rights-based ap-
108. See, e.g., Hum phers v. First Interstate Bank of Or.. 684 P.2d 581. 587 (O r. Ct. App. 1984). 
a f fd  in part, rev’d  in part, 696 P.2d 527 (O r. 1985).
[TJhere is widespread public knowledge of the ethical standards of the medical profession and 
widespread belief that confidences made by a patient to  a physician may not be disclosed without 
the permission of the patient. Patients . . .  have the right to  rely on this common understanding of 
the ethical requirem ents which have been placed on the medical profession and to obtain dam ­
ages against a physician if he violates such confidentiality.
Id.-, see also D uquette v. Superior Court ex. ret. County of M aricopa. 778 P.2d 634. 640 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1989) (“[T]he public has a w idespread belief that inform ation given to  a physician in confidence will 
not be disclosed to third parties absent legal compulsion, and we further believe that the public has a 
right to have this expectation realized.”).
109. See generally Nicolas P. Terry. W hat’s Wrong with Health Privacy?, in  T h e  L a w  a n d  
B io e t h ic s  (A na Smith litis & Sandra H. Johnson eds.. forthcoming 2007).
110. W ikipedia offers this definition of EDI:
Electronic D ata Interchange (ED I) is the com puter-to-com puter exchange of structured informa­
tion. by agreed message standards, from one com puter application to  another by electronic means 
and with a minimum of hum an intervention. In common usage. EDI is understood to m ean spe­
cific interchange methods agreed upon by national or international standards bodies for the trans­
fer of business transaction data, with one typical application being the autom ated purchase of 
goods and services.
W ikipedia. Electronic Data Interchange, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Data_Interchange 
(last visited Oct. 3.2006).
111. See M arie C. Pollio, The Inadequacy o f  H IP A A ’s Privacy Rule: The Plain Language Notice 
o f  Privacy Practices and Patient Understanding, 60 N.Y.U. A n n . SlJRV. A m . L. 579.585-86 (2004).
112. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.164 (2005).
113. 428 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2005); see infra text accompanying note 209.
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proach to privacy and confidentiality, preferring an instrumental ration­
ale that is almost totally focused on institutions and compliance.
This process is being endorsed during the adoption of EHR tech­
nologies. Process-driven, technologically enabled healthcare delivery, of 
which the EHR is a core component, seeks to minimize the role of the 
individual autonomous physician (and the correlative autonomous pa­
tient). These next-generation healthcare technologies replace autonomy 
and choice with systems that identify while simultaneously commodifying 
patients (e.g., by positively identifying them with bar codes) and reduce 
discretion in treatment (e.g., by relying on Clinical Practice Guidelines 
and Clinical Decision Support Systems). Such technologies have a huge, 
potentially deleterious impact on individuals’ privacy and confidentiality. 
“Yet, they are likely to be accompanied by minimalist protections that, 
as with the federal standards in HIPAA, will be designed so as not to im­
pede the overall error-reduction model, for example, by favoring out­
comes research to further the greater good of population-based care.”114 
As we argue in this article, the adoption of EHR technologies should be 
used as an opportunity to reverse this trend and adopt an approach to 
patient privacy and confidentiality that recognizes an autonomy-based, 
default position of full patient control over personal information.115 This 
default should be compromised only in a narrow range of circumstances, 
such as allowing the information to flow within the “circle of care” or 
medical teams, to be shared after real and informed consent by the pa­
tient, or to be used in cases where the data has been fully stripped of 
identifiers. An initial clarification, however, should be emphasized at 
this point: our claims in what follows apply only to EHRs; nothing we say 
is intended to apply to or to preclude current practices in which patients 
consent to the sharing of their health information. Our point is only that 
these processes should continue to take place outside of the development 
of the EHR architecture, at least in its initial trial period.
D. Promoting Privacy, Confidentiality, and Security
EHRs are not like paper records writ larger. The differences for pa­
tient privacy and confidentiality and data security are matters of kind, 
not simply matters of degree. The irony is that the more inefficient a 
health records system, the more it is silo-based and makes interoperabil­
ity difficult, the fewer confidentiality and security issues it will pose.116 
However, such inefficient systems will not realize the potential benefits 
of an EIHR. Multisite EMRs or EHRs raise the stakes for protection of 
important values for patients: patient privacy, informed consent about
114. Terry, supra note 109.
115. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Privacy and Medicine: A  Comment, 30 J. L e g a l  St u d . 709, 
711-12 (2001).
116. See generally H odge et al., supra note 5.
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what will be included in records and with whom these records will be 
shared, and accuracy of records and resulting quality of care. The basic 
issues here are accessibility, security, and replicability. Electronic re­
cords can be viewed from across the globe; cut, pasted, or otherwise al­
tered; and copied and recopied with a switch of the finger.117 All occur 
apparently invisibly, though means of tracking changes are of course pos­
sible.
The prevailing article of faith espoused by policymakers and regula­
tors in the United States is that patient information (be it transactional or 
safety related) is to be protected by mechanisms to ensure data confiden­
tiality and security.118 Confidentiality (mislabeled by HIPAA as “pri­
vacy”) limits access to previously disclosed patient data, thus denying the 
option to leverage data for secondary uses such as marketing or patient 
profiling. Security keeps out “hackers” who would misappropriate, dam­
age, or destroy data. In this article, we challenge the effectiveness of this 
protective model in the EIHR context and defend the importance of 
both limiting data access to providers within the “circle of care” on a 
need-to-know basis, and basing the choice of which EHR architecture to 
implement on the need to maximize data security.
Patient privacy refers to the extent to which information about pa­
tients is gleaned in the first place. A decision by a patient not to share 
information with a provider, or to give misleading information, both ex­
ercises and protects privacy, but at the sacrifice of timely, accurate diag­
nosis and treatment. Efforts by patients to obtain healthcare services 
without having them entered into their medical records—such as anony­
mous HIV testing—also protect privacy, but at the cost of what may be 
important omissions in the medical record that can adversely affect pa­
tient care.
The principal patient privacy question posed by EHRs is whether 
patient information should be entered into a system of electronic records 
in the first place. As an interoperable electronic record system is devel­
oped, there are a number of options for protecting patient privacy. Pa­
tients could enter an interoperable system only on an “opt-in” basis; oth­
erwise, their records would remain silo-ed in the offices of providers. Or, 
patients could be allowed to specify that records from particular provid­
ers or from particular visits be omitted from the electronic record. Still 
another option would allow patients to specify that certain types of sensi­
tive information be kept out of the electronic record.
Patients who do not opt in to a linked records system will lose what­
ever benefits might attend an interoperable system. Some of the benefits 
of electronic records, such as the use of clinical decision support tools 
that can be downloaded to an office computer or automatic generation of
117. See P e w  I n t e r n e t  &  Am. L ife  P r o j e c t ,  supra  n o te  89, a t 3.
118. See, e.g., M a r k l e  F o u n d a t i o n ,  supra n o te  73, a t 43-58.
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reminders and other informational letters to patients, are available with 
electronic records that are fully isolated from linkages beyond the indi­
vidual provider’s office. Other benefits, however—including the use of 
internet-based provider-patient communication systems; off-site access to 
records; coordination of records among providers; or inclusion of records 
in larger data sets designed to monitor care quality, patient safety, or pa­
tient outcomes—are available only in limited forms or are completely 
unavailable with fully silo-ed records. It can be expected that, as use of 
electronic records grows, this option will become increasingly difficult to 
maintain.
A second privacy-protective option would allow patients to specify 
that entire records from particular providers, or entire records of particu­
lar visits, be kept out of any linked electronic record system. Patients 
might want, for example, to exclude from the electronic record visits to 
any mental health professionals, treatment for sexual dysfunction, or the 
fact that an HIV test was performed. Patients may also wish to exclude 
information gathered in visits for second opinions; they may wish to be 
able to reconfirm or reevaluate diagnoses or treatment recommendations 
without informing their original care provider of additional consultation. 
Exclusion of such records, however, may compromise the accuracy of the 
electronic record; providers accessing the record may assume that it is 
complete and, relying on it, make decisions about care based on records 
that omit critical information. Such omissions can be dangerous; diagno­
sis and treatment may fail to take account of the use of psychotropic 
medications or drugs for erectile dysfunction, for example. Providers 
might remain suspicious of records’ inclusiveness—or records might even 
be flagged for incompleteness—but as electronic records increasingly be­
come the standard of care, reliance on them is likely to become routine.
Despite these difficulties, in order to maintain trust in an electronic 
record system it may be important to require informed consent on an in­
dividual provider basis before patient records are entered into a linked 
system. A report from the Markle Foundation concludes that this guar­
antee is necessary to generate trust in linked records systems.119 The re­
port recommends that current providers not enter records into a linked 
system without consent and that consent be negotiated for the entry of 
prior records.120 The Markle report also recommends that anonymous or 
pseudonymous record entry be explored where linked data sets are nec­
essary for outcomes research or public health surveillance.121
Yet another privacy-protective option would allow patients to stipu­
late exclusion of certain types of information from the medical record:
119. See M a r k l e  F o u n d a t io n , supra note 73, at 31-32.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 32.
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information about genetic testing,122 HIV testing, or treatment for condi­
tions such as sexually transmitted diseases, for example. This option also 
raises difficulties about the integrity of the record for treatment pur­
poses. In addition, it may be costly and impractical, depending on system 
design. Any system that requires physicians (or office staff) to redact 
embargoed information from the medical record before it is entered into 
the linked electronic record will require time-consuming processes of 
data separation as well as a two-tier medical record system. Primary 
providers will need to remember to consult the complete record; secon­
dary providers will not know what has been omitted from the linked re­
cord. Moreover, it may prove impossible to effectively segregate all of 
the embargoed information; information left in the linked record may be 
as revealing of the patient’s condition as redacted information. For ex­
ample, redaction of an HIV test may not protect the privacy of a patient 
who does not want information about a diagnosis of HIV/AIDS in the 
medical record, if the record also contains a note about treatment for an 
HIV-related fungal infection.
Electronic record design that separates data fields at the time of re­
cord creation may be less costly to administer. Yet such “pull” systems 
are flawed because they are limited by the information the patient 
chooses to include, but may not effectively cull out all the information 
the patient wishes to exclude. A “pull” system that enters all prescrip­
tion data, for example, may be as revealing of a diagnosis of HIV/A IDS 
as the actual HIV test itself.
Patients are justly concerned about what an EIHR may mean for 
their privacy. On the other hand, records system designs that attempt to 
protect privacy by choosing the information entered into the record in 
the first place are potentially both misleading and difficult to maintain. 
At present, therefore, it seems that the best way to protect patient pri­
vacy is to provide for patients to join an EIHR on an opt-in basis, rather 
than being entered into such a system automatically. If larger data sets 
are needed for outcomes research or for disease surveillance, they could 
be constructed with anonymous or with pseudonymous records. Com­
plete records would be entered into the system for patients who opt in.
As a national EIHR is developed, safeguards also will need to be 
put into place to protect patient confidentiality; downstream limitations 
on the disclosure of patient information should be included in the EIHR. 
The most protective standards would ensure that health records are not 
shared without patient consent except within the “circle of care”—that is, 
with practitioners who are immediately and directly involved in the care 
of the patient—and on an as-needed basis with another member of a pa­
tient’s medical team. This assurance is one of the most important guar­
antees for patients. Given patient attitudes towards the privacy of their
122. See generally David E. Winickoff, Isaac S. Kohane & Russ B. Altm an, Health-Information 
Altruists, 354 N e w  E n g . J. M e d . 530 ,530 -31  (2006).
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healthcare information, suspicion of electronic records, and the disadvan­
tages detailed above of protecting patients by excluding information 
from the record, these confidentiality guarantees are essential.
Just as with paper records, there will be situations in which elec­
tronic health information cannot be kept confidential. The format of the 
record will not change state reporting requirements for conditions as var­
ied as gunshot wounds, abuse, infectious diseases, or factors that impair 
driving capacity. Providers should discuss limits on confidentiality with 
patients before giving care, as providers ideally do now when there is a 
likelihood of required reporting. What may be changed are the ease, 
speed, and certainty of reporting. Record architecture could be designed 
so that providers enter data only once, but that reportable data is trans­
ferred automatically as it is entered into the record, without implicating 
other information in the record. For example, some states require re­
porting of controlled substance prescriptions to state agencies; providers 
then search the database before prescribing controlled substances to 
guard against drug abuse or diversion.123 This entire process can be elec­
tronic. In advance of receiving such prescriptions, patients can be in­
formed both of the requirement that the medications be entered into da­
tabases and of their providers’ protocols for searching databases. 
Patients who do not want their information entered into the database 
could reject the prescription. The ease and speed of electronic transmis­
sions intensify the importance of informing the patient when reporting is 
anticipated. A similar structure of single entry/copied data could be util­
ized when patients consent to the sharing of particular information out­
side of the circle of care, such as for billing purposes. Our point here is 
not to reject current structures by which patients consent to sharing 
healthcare information; it is that such means for sharing should be built 
in at the point of data entry, not at the point of the full EHR.
Serious questions of accuracy and fraud attend any electronic re­
cords system. EHRs can be erased, cut, or pasted without the kind of 
physical trail left when offices are broken into and paper records are 
tampered with. EHRs are also searchable, and such searches are quick 
and cheap. This raises the stakes about what is included in a record. A 
note or an unauthorized alteration, dating from many years in the past, 
can be brought back to notice more quickly than in a paper record. With 
paper, it is far more likely that old or inaccurate records will simply re­
main buried and unremarked; unearthing the records would take a long 
read through the paper file and might be regarded as irrelevant. To be 
sure, paper records can also be altered. But conventions have been de­
veloped to guard against such malfeasance: records must be dated, en-
123. See, e.g., Office of H ealth  Professionals Regulation, Board of Pharmacy: Controlled Sub­
stance Reporting U pdate, http://www.health.ri.gov/hsr/professions/csr_reporting.php (last visited Oct. 
3, 2006); U tah D ep’t of Commerce, U tah’s Controlled Substance D atabase, http://csdb.utah.gov/ (last 
visited Feb. 1,2007).
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tered in ink, etc. Erasures can be apparent visually. With electronic re­
cords, similar conventions must be developed to ensure data integrity 
and facilitate audit.124
Data integrity will require a method for authentication. With elec­
tronic records, there must be a method in place to ensure that entries are 
dated and signed. Unique identifiers that are difficult to steal will be 
needed to authorize entries, and penalties should attach to unauthorized 
sharing of identifiers. Methods will also need to be implemented to track 
and prevent any entry changes. Records should be correctable, but there 
should be a method of noting that a correction has been made and what 
the correction entailed. Otherwise, the integrity of all electronic records 
will be suspect. Still another difficulty is the need to guard against care­
less copying of records and the possibility that errors will be introduced 
thereby. The Veterans Health Administration has found that one in ten 
electronic records contains plagiarized text and has implemented detec­
tion software as a result.125 Conventions for data entry and authentica­
tion need to be commonly used and understood among all providers.
One of the most difficult issues for data security is to ensure that re­
cords are not subject to inappropriate access that is either inadvertent or 
deliberate.126 Tn order to gain access to paper records, someone must be 
physically present with the record. By contrast, inadvertent release of 
records and computer hacking are notorious problems with certain elec­
tronic records—credit card information, for example.127 Courts have 
wrestled with the risks of identity theft raised by electronic records such 
as financial statements involved in divorce proceedings; they have re­
sponded with solutions such as keeping the records in encrypted PDF 
files on silo-ed local networks without outside access.128 Medical infor­
mation is at least as sensitive as information of these kinds, and before it 
is assembled in a linkable, accessible fashion, these issues of protection
124. F or a criticism of the data integrity and security mechanisms in A ustralia’s HealthConnect 
record system, see Livia lacovino, Trustworthy Shared Electronic Health Records: Recordkeeping Re­
quirements and HealthConnect, 12 J.L. & M e d . 40 (2004).
125. Kenric W. Ham m ond e t al., A re Electronic Medical Records Trustworthy? Observations on 
Copying, Pasting and Duplication, A m . M e d . I n f o r m a t ic s  A ss ’n A n n . S y m p . P r o c . 269 (2003).
126. See, e.g., D an Richman, Hacker at UW Medicine Revealed, S e a t t l e  P o s t -In t e l l ig e n c e r , 
Feb. 16, 2006, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/259725_computerl6.html (disclosing that 
hacker had opportunity to access two million patient records for eighteen m onths before security hole 
discovered); Jaikum ar Viyayan, FBI Probes H acking Incident at Indiana Clinic, Co m p u t e r w o r l d , 
Feb. 10, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,108585,00.html.
127. F or a discussion of technical issues in data security, see Mike Boniface & Paul Wilkin, 
A R T E M IS: Towards a Secure Interoperability Infrastructure for Healthcare Information Systems, 112 
St u d . H e a l t h  T e c h . & I n f o r m a t ic s  181 (2005).
128. F or discussions of the difficulties courts have faced in implementing electronic records sys­
tems, see, for example, Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and  
Privacy in an A ge o f  Electronic Information, 79 W a s h . L. R e v . 307 (2004); K risten M . Blankley, Note, 
A re Public Records Too Public? Why Personally Identifying Information Should Be Rem oved from  
Both Online and Print Versions o f  Court Documents, 65 O h io  S t. L J . 413 (2004). In the view of one 
court, paper records languished in ‘'practical obscurity,” an unlikely fate for electronic records. U.S. 
D ep’t of Justice v. R eporters Comm, for Freedom  of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989).
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must be solved.129 Records of any unauthorized access must be kept, and 
patients must be assured that they will be notified if their records have 
become subject to unauthorized examination.130 Such record-keeping 
and notification systems can be inexpensive if the default mechanism is 
an e-mail to the patient of an unauthorized record access, combined with 
general publicity about large-scale breaches of data security.131
Another difficult issue with electronic records is the ease with which 
they can be duplicated and multiplied. Of course, paper records can be 
copied too. But with electronic records, multiple copies can be gener­
ated at the flick of a key, more readily than the brooms in The Sorcerer’s 
Apprentice. These copies can materialize as e-mail attachments, burned 
CDs, easily transported diskettes or portable hardware devices, among 
other forms. As with paper records, copies of EHRs should not be made 
or shared without patient permission, except as within ordinary provider 
office practice. Electronic safeguards should be in place to detect when 
copying has taken place.
Once “out,” electronic copies of an electronic record cannot be eas­
ily traced or retrieved. Indeed, it may not be clear where all the copies 
have gone. Information that should not have been included in the re­
cord, that was inaccurate and has been corrected in the record by the 
original provider, or that was inappropriately linked, may never be cor­
rected in copies that have been released. The analogous problem arises 
for copies of paper records that were made at a given point in time, but it 
is exacerbated with the ease of transmission of electronic records. In ad­
dition to the risks of confidentiality, this ease of transmission poses real 
risks for the care of mobile patients; if the “wrong” electronic record is 
accessed, patient injury may be the result.
Finally, methods must be developed for tracking what is done with 
electronic records that have been properly released and for redacting in­
formation that should not have been released. For example, providers 
sometimes include information in records that is not medically related, 
such as social security numbers. This type of information should not be 
released in the first place, but if it is, it should be subject to tracing and 
redaction. Information in a record is sometimes corrected or updated, 
and there must be ways to ensure that these additions are made to re­
cords that were previously released. If updated information, such as a 
diagnostic test that reveals a prior false positive, is not included in all 
copies, this omission creates the risk that accuracy will be falsely assumed 
and that care will be directed inappropriately.
129. See generally Joseph Menn, ID  Theft Infects Medical Records, L.A. T im e s , Sept. 25, 2006, ai 
A l (describing the consequences of and difficulties in preventing m edical identity theft).
130. E than  Preston and Paul T urner note that disclosure regimes are required in California and in 
the European Union. E than Preston & Paul Turner, The Global Rise o f  a D uty to Disclose In form a­
tion Security Breaches, 22 J. M a r s h a l l  J. C o m p u t e r  &  I n f o . L. 457 (2004).
131. This is the default regime in California. Ca l . Civ. C o d e  § 1798.82(g)(3) (W est Supp. 2006).
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These concerns about privacy, data confidentiality, and data secu­
rity place special pressures on the creation, maintenance, and use of elec­
tronic records. They raise difficulties that must be solved before link­
able, searchable, and accessible electronic records are generalized to the 
population. Many of these issues raise complex technical questions. 
Others require the development of practices such as informed consent 
before identifiable information about patients is entered into databases 
or linked with other records. We return to these issues in the discussion 
of strategies for record development, patient choice, and regulation be­
low.
TV. T h e  L e g a l  L a n d s c a p e
As already noted, the Bush administration has framed the privacy- 
confidentiality “issue” as one involving state laws whose divergence cre­
ates a barrier to the successful implementation of a national EIHR.132 
The apparent conclusion is that the HIPAA Privacy of Individually Iden­
tifiable Health Information (PIHI) savings clause for more stringent 
state laws134 should be rescinded.135 In contrast, we argue that the issue 
should be framed as how to resolve the serious privacy-confidentiality 
issues raised by a national EIHR system.136 Part of that analysis depends 
on an examination of the extent to which patient privacy-confidentiality 
under such a system would be protected by existing legal controls.
A fundamental terminological problem obscures comprehension of 
the current state of the protection of health information in the United 
States. The media, commentators, courts, and legislators frequently refer 
to health “privacy” issues or protective models. In fact, two distinct is­
sues must be addressed, issues that find articulation in two separate legal 
doctrines. Personal health information may be under threat either by its 
collection or its disclosure. The law has responded to those threats sepa-
132. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
133. See O f f ic e  f o r  C iv il  R ig h t s . U.S. D e p ’t  o f  H e a l t h  &  H u m a n  S e r v s ., St a n d a r d s  f o r  
P r iv a c y  o f  In d iv id u a l l y  Id e n t if ia b l e  H e a l t h  In f o r m a t io n  (2003). available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/combinedregtext.pdf.
134. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2005).
135. See, e.g.. H ealth Inform ation Technology Prom otion Act of 2006. H.R. 4157. 109th Cong. 
§ 205 (2006) (contemplating national uniform standards on confidentiality and security and with pre­
emptive effect).
136. See also Letter from Consum er Coalition for H ealth Privacy (CCHP) to Scott Wallace. 
Chairman. Comm’n on Systemic Interoperability (Oct. 7. 2005). available at http://www.healthprivacy. 
org/usr_doc/Commission_Letter.pdf. In this letter, the CCHP
strongly urge[s Chairman Wallace] to abandon any recom m endation that takes privacy rights 
away from patients. In fact, instead of disabling protections, there should be a serious effort to 
bolster and extend established privacy rights. While the H IPA A  Privacy Rule serves as a solid 
foundation for protecting privacy, it does not address many of the issues health  inform ation tech­
nology raises. For instance, many entities collecting and sharing electronic health  inform ation are 
not covered by the law. In this context, stripping consumers of current safeguards is not just mis­
guided but dangerous, and would undoubtedly have a drastic impact on the extent to which pa­
tients are willing to engage in health  inform ation technology initiatives.
Id.
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rately, expressed as the distinct models of privacy and confidentiality,137 
A privacy model places limitations on data collection , 1 3 8  Such a model 
could, for example, prohibit all collection in certain circumstances or 
limit collection via a proportionality rule (e.g., only information neces­
sary for treatment). The confidentiality model places limitations on data 
disclosure (e.g., hospital records may be disclosed to physicians, but not 
drug companies). Related protective models are either ancillary or cor­
ollary. For example, a right of anonymity provides the patient with a 
method to ensure privacy,139 while security systems create the technical 
environment to limit access to information to those records subject to 
confidentiality-based disclosure control.
Although frequently described in terms of privacy and privacy law, 
the legal protections applied to patient health information by the com­
mon law, state statutes, or the HIPAA federal standards have very little 
to do with either. As will be seen, the law of privacy (or collection- 
centric legal models) is narrowly circumscribed and underdeveloped. In 
contrast, the confidentiality protective model, whereby limitations are 
placed on data disclosure, is well established in U.S. law.140
Contemporary U.S. confidentiality and privacy models (particularly 
as applied to an EIHR) are shaped and constrained by several persistent 
features. First, the regulation of medical records is primarily a creature 
of state law.141 Second, the law relating to the privacy of medical infor­
mation is woefully underdeveloped.142 Third, while comparatively ma­
ture, state common law and statutory medical confidentiality regulations 
provide few solutions to the threats posed by an EIHR.143 Fourth, the 
more recent HIPAA Privacy Regulations144 have created a (frequently 
parallel) federal confidentiality code whose flaws become considerably 
more obvious when mapped to an EIHR. Finally, U.S. law generally 
permits patients to waive or sign away almost all controls on the collec­
tion or dissemination of their personal health information.145 In only 
very limited circumstances are there bright-line rules rendering health 
information inalienable.146
137. Health Record Hearings, supra note 6, al 5.
138. Id.
139. See infra lexl accompanying notes 239-44.
140. See Hodge et al., supra note 5, at 1468 (1999).
141. See id.
142. See id. a t 1467.
143. See id. a t 1468.
144. Security and Privacy, 45 C..F.R. § 164 (2005).
145. See, e.g., 45 C..F.R. § 164.503.
146. See Hodge et al., supra note 5, a t 1468.
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A. State Law Paradigms
Historically, the governance of medical records has been a matter of 
state law.147 As a result, ownership of records, access to records, manda­
tory reporting, and data protection rules vary by state. The HIPAA 
transactional standards represent one very important exception to this 
general rule, but an incomplete and flawed exception because the so- 
called privacy provisions (but not the security or transactional rules) are 
subject to a savings clause preserving some state protections.148 State- 
centricity is inconsistent with the proposed U.S. EIHR system. Whether 
truly national or regionally based, the EIHR will be an interstate crea­
ture. And, for the promise of the EIHR to be fulfilled, data must be en­
tered only one time and must be accessible from any part of the country.
It is generally accepted that doctors own the medical records they 
keep about patients.149 State statutes have extended that default position 
to hospital records.150 In addition to federal regulatory151 and Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) 
accreditation rules,152 state law (state statutory, licensing, or even com­
mon law malpractice requirements) imposes duties of accuracy, com­
pleteness, legibility, and timeliness.153 State statutes may prohibit the al­
teration of records,154 while diverse common law remedies for spoliation 
create disincentives to their concealment or destruction.155 Although
147. See id.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2000); see also H ealth  Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, Sec. 264(c)(2) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 
42 U .S.C ).
149. See, e.g., Am erican Medical Association, E-7.04 Sale of a Medical Practice, http://www.ama- 
assn.org/ama/pub/category/8381.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2006); see also B reen v. Williams (1996) 186 
C.L.R. 71 (Austl.); Regensdorfer v. Orange R eg’l Med. Ctr., 799 N.Y.S.2d 571 (2005) (dealing with 
ownership, transfer, and lending of mam mography and pathology films).
150. See, e.g., T e n n . C o d e  A n n . § 68 -ll-304(a)(l) (1995) (“Hospital records are and shall rem ain 
the property of the various hospitals . . . . ”).
151. M edicare Conditions of Participation: Medical R ecord Services, 42 C.F.R. § 482.24(b)(c) 
(1999).
152. “T h e  m edical reco rd  con ta in s suffic ient in fo rm atio n  to  iden tify  th e  p a tien t; su p p o rt the  d iag ­
nosis/cond ition ; justify  th e  care, tre a tm en t, and  services; d o cu m en t th e  course  and  resu lts  o f care, 
tre a tm e n t, and  services; and p ro m o te  con tinu ity  o f care  am ong p ro v id e rs .” 2005 C r it ic a l  A c c ess  
H o s p it a l  St a n d a r d s : M a n a g e m e n t  o f  I n f o r m a t io n  1M.6.10.6, at 14 (Jo in t C om m ission  on  A c­
c re d ita tio n  o f H ea lth ca re  O rgan izations ed ., 2005).
153. See, e.g., N.M . St a t . § 61-6-15 D (1978) (“‘Unprofessional or dishonorable conduct’ . . .  in­
cludes . . .  (33) im proper m anagem ent of medical records, including failure to m aintain timely, accu­
rate, legible and complete medical records”); N e v . R e v . St a t . § 630.3062(1) (2003); W y o . St a t . A n n . 
§ 33-26-402(a) (xxvii) (G ) (2005); Nieves v. Chassin, 625 N.Y.S.2d 344. (N.Y. App. Div. 3d 1995); 
Schwarz v. Bd. of Regents, 453 N.Y.S.2d 836, 836-37 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d 1982); see also Thomas v. 
United States, 660 F. Supp. 216, 218. (D.D.C. 1987) (keeping inadequate summary records may consti­
tute malpractice).
154. See, e.g., N e v . R e v . St a t . A n n . § 630.3062-2.
155. See, e.g., Rosenblit v. Z im m erm an, 766 A.2d 749, 754-58 (N.J. 2001) (canvassing various 
remedies and adopting independent tort remedy); cf. Brown v. Ham id, 856 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Mo. 1993) 
( “The Missouri cases, statutes, and common law address a physician’s duty to let the patient inspect 
and copy medical records. They do not create an independent duty to  maintain  medical records. To 
be sure, in another case, failure to m aintain medical records may contribute to, or constitute, medical
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supplemented by Federal Medicare rules,156 state statutory rales gener­
ally continue to govern records retention.157
B. Privacy
Although the U.S. Constitution does not contain any generalized 
right of privacy, the Supreme Court has recognized limited privacy rights 
derived from various constitutional provisions.158 Whalen v. Roe is the 
foundational case, recognizing not only autonomy or decisional privacy 
(“independence in making certain kinds of important decisions”),159 but 
also informational privacy (“the individual interest in avoiding disclosure 
of personal matters”).16*1 Whalen concerned the validity of a state statute 
requiring computerized record keeping (including patient identification) 
of scheduled prescription drags. The Court held that, on the record as 
presented, arguments of potential breach of security or confidentiality by 
IT, medical, or judicial actors did not “pose a sufficiently grievous threat 
to either interest to establish a constitutional violation.”161
The Whalen court recognized “a host o f . . .  unpleasant invasions of 
privacy that are associated with many facets of health care,” while noting 
that such disclosures “are often an essential part of modern medical prac­
tice.”162 Although Whalen did not decide the issue,163 the court hinted 
that such an invasion would rise to the level of a constitutional violation 
only if such a scheme failed to “evidence a proper concern with, and pro­
tection of, the individual’s interest in privacy.”164
Since Whalen, several federal courts have recognized constitution­
ally protected privacy rights in connection with medical165 and prescrip-
m alpractice.. . .  There is no need, in this case, to recognize an independent tort of negligent m ainte­
nance of m edical records.”).
156. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 482.24(b)(1) (2005) (“Medical records must be retained in their original 
o r legally reproduced form for a period of at least 5 years.”).
157. ’ See, e.g.. L a . R ev . S t a t .  A nn . § 40:2144(F) (2001 & Supp. 2006); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-2 
(LexisNexis 2003).
158. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). See generally R oe v. W ade, 410 
U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (“[A] right of personal privacy, o r a guarantee o f certain areas o r zones of pri­
vacy” is rooted in “the First A m endm ent; in the Fourth  and Fifth Am endm ents; in the penum bras of 
the Bill of Rights; in the Ninth A m endm ent; o r in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section 
of the Fourteenth  A m endm ent.” (citations om itted)).
159. W halen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,599-600 (1977).
160 Id. at 599.
161. Id. at 600-02.
162. Id. at 602.
163. “W e therefore need not, and do not, decide any question which might be presented by the 
unwarranted disclosure o f accumulated private da I a whelher intentional o r unintentional—or by a 
system that did not contain com parable security provisions.” Id. at 605-06.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g.. Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000); F.E.R . v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 
1530,1535 (10th Cir. 1995); Lankford v. City o f H obart, 27 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1994); A.L.A. v. W. 
Valley City, 26 F.3d 989, 990 (10th Cir. 1994); U nited States v. W estinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 
580 (3d Cir. 1980).
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tion records.166 Although recognized, this informational privacy right is 
not absolute. For example, in Douglas v. Dobbs,161 a recent Tenth Cir­
cuit case stemming from a court-authorized police search of pharmacy 
records, the court noted: “We have no difficulty concluding that protec­
tion of a right to privacy in a person’s prescription drug records . . .  is suf­
ficiently similar to other areas already protected within the ambit of pri­
vacy.”168 However, this abstract right was insufficient given that the 
plaintiff failed her burden of showing that the right has been violated by 
the defendant of record.169
Several state constitutions explicitly protect privacy.170 Typically 
this privacy right has been applied to medical records. For example, one 
state high court opined: “Because Georgia recognizes an even broader 
concept of privacy [than the federal constitution], the personal medical 
records of this state’s citizens clearly are protected by that right as guar­
anteed by our constitution.”171 However, as with its recognition by the 
federal courts, this right of informational privacy is not absolute and is 
subject to typical public health, law enforcement, and other exceptions.172
At common law, it is beyond cavil that, as one court has stated, “[i]f 
there is any right of privacy at all, it should include the right to obtain 
medical treatment at home or in a hospital for an individual personal 
condition (at least if it is not contagious or dangerous to others) without 
personal publicity.”173 Such a broad statement notwithstanding, U.S. pri­
vacy law limitations on data collection in the healthcare domain are less 
than robust. The Restatement’s black-letter law of “privacy”174 fails to 
provide any general or comprehensive “right of privacy.” Rather, the 
“right” is a bundle of discrete tort actions and is highly qualified at 
that.175 The patient must rely on factually restricted,176 doctrinally lim-
166. See, e.g., U nited States v. Sutherland, 143 F. Supp. 2d 609,610 (W.D. Va. 2001).
167. Douglas v. Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2005).
168. Id. at 1102.
169. Id. ai 1103. The defendant in this § 1983 action was an assistant district attorney who had 
approved a police officer’s decision to request authorization from  the court to conduct a warrantless 
investigation of pharm acy records.
170. See, e.g., A l a s k a  C o n s t , art. I, § 22; F l a . Co n s t , a rt. I, § 23; G a . Co n s t , a rt. I, § 1, % 1.
171. King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 494 (Ga. 2000).
172. See, e.g., Limbaugh v. State, 887 So. 2d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2004); F rank v. 
State, 912 So. 2d 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2005); Rollins v. Ulmer, 15 P.3d 749, 750 (Alaska 
2001).
173. B arber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291,295 (Mo. 1942).
174. R e s t a t e m e n t  (Se c o n d ) o f  T o r t s  § 652 (1965); see also Afro-Am. Publ’g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 
F.2d 649, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (recognizing common law tort); Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333 
(Wash. 1998) (adopting § 652).
175. See, e.g., G ilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 310 (10th Cir. 1981) (outlining incidents of 
m alpractice by doctor and including her psychiatric history was protected First Am endm ent). F or fur­
ther discussion of privacy rights, see Lee v. Calhoun, 948 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1991), where a doctor 
publicly defended himself against a high profile malpractice claim by arguing in a newspaper that the 
misdiagnosis occurred because the patient had not disclosed that he had AIDS. Id. at 1164. The court 
dismissed the subsequent invasion of privacy claim by the patien t on the basis that the patient had be­
come a public figure and m alpractice was a m atter of public interest. Id. at 1165.
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itecl.:: and somewhat clumsy protections against “unreasonable intrusion 
upon the seclusion of another”178 or “public disclosure of private facts.”179 
As a result, common law privacy actions tend to be successful in only a 
few extreme or outlying cases of medical intrusions180 or publications.181
C. Confidentiality
Prior to the promulgation of the federal standards, most states had 
developed robust common law and statutory protections applicable to 
the confidentiality of health information. For example, there is now con­
siderable consistency across the states in recognizing an “independent” 
or torts-based remedy for breach of confidence.182 The cause of action is 
theoretically (and variously) based on licensing statutes, the physician’s 
evidentiary privilege, common law principles of trust, the Hippocratic 
oath, and general principles of medical ethics.183 Only a handful of states 
reject the general proposition,184 although some persist in grounding it on 
an outmoded doctrinal basis such as implied contract or breach of a fidu­
ciary relationship.185
The common law action for breach of confidence differs from the 
less-developed common law tort of privacy. One court has stated the 
most practical difference: “Only one who holds information in confi-
176. See, e.g., Knight v. Penobscot Bay Med. C.tr., 420 A.2d 915 (Me. 1980) (finding no evidence 
that a hospital w orker’s husband who observed a stranger’s labor and delivery had intended the intru­
sion); Corcoran v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (requiring that defendant 
intended o r perm itted unreasonable publication); Fisher v. State, 106 P.3d 836 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) 
(requiring deliberate intrusion); see also Mikel v. A bram s, 541 F. Supp. 591, 597, a ffd  716 F.2d 907 
(8th Cir. 1983) (breach of privacy not applicable to doctor’s disclosure to plaintiff’s spouse); Tooley v. 
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Curry v. Corn, 277 N.Y.S.2d 
470 (N.Y. Special Term  1966); cf. Colleen M. v. Fertility & Surgical Assocs. of Thousand Oaks, 34 Cal. 
R ptr. 3d 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (patient had reasonable expectation of privacy that clinic would not 
disclose specific nature of her treatm ent to ex-fiance, notwithstanding her charging of treatm ent on his 
credit card).
177. See, e.g., T ureen v. Equifax, 571 F.2d 411, 419 (8th Cir. 1978) (requiring “disclosure to the 
general public o r likely to reach the general public”); see also R e s t a t e m e n t  (S e c o n d ) o f  T o r t s  
§ 652D cmt. c. (1977) (discussing “highly offensive” requirem ent).
178. R e s t a t e m e n t  (S e c o n d ) o f T o r t s  § 652(A )(2)(a) (1977).
179. P r o s s e r  a n d  K e e t o n  on  T o r t s  856 (W. Page  K eeto n  e t  al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
180. See, e.g., Estate o f Berthiaum e v. P ratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976) (physician intruded into a 
dying cancer pa tien t’s “physical o r m ental solitude or seclusion” when he took unauthorized photo­
graphs); see also Swarthout v. Mut. Serv. Life Ins., 632 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. Ct. A pp. 2001) (doctrine 
applicable when a life insurance company altered an applicant’s medical inform ation release, used it to 
obtain inform ation from o ther sources, and transm itted the inform ation to  a medical records database, 
which was available to o ther insurers).
181. See, e.g., Vassiliades v. G arfinckel’s, 492 A.2d 580, 585 (D.C. 1985) (upholding verdicts of 
invasion of privacy based on publicity of private facts and breach of fiduciary duty against plastic sur­
geon for use of “before” and “after” photographs of patient).
182. See, e.g., id. at 592; Biddle v. W arren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (O hio 1999); M cCor­
mick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431 (S.C.. Ct. A pp. 1997). See generally A lan B. Vickery, Note, Breach o f  
Confidence: A n  Emerging Tori, 82 C.OLUM. L. R e v . 1426 (1982).
183. See, e.g., Vassiliades, 492 A.2d at 590.
184. See, e.g., Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249,252 (Tenn. 1965).
185. See, e.g., Fierstein v. D ePaul H ealth C.tr., 24 S.W.3d 220,223 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
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dence can be charged with a breach of confidence. Tf an act qualifies as a 
tortious invasion of privacy, it theoretically could be committed by any­
one.”186 The converse is also true: if information that is not secret or pri­
vate is entrusted in confidence, its subsequent disclosure may be action­
able.187
Many states now also have some form of legislation that protects 
medical information against disclosure, though few contain a compre­
hensive prohibition against the disclosure of confidential medical infor­
mation. Rather, and similar to the HTPAA code, state statutes tend to 
create a provider “disclosure” code detailing the large number of “safe 
harbor” occasions and circumstances in which healthcare and other ac­
tors are permitted to disclose confidential medical information.188 Also, 
like HTPAA, the legislation in most states does not permit a private right 
of action by patients.189 Some state laws protect only health information 
in the hands of the state, not in the offices of private providers.190
Both federal191 and state courts192 have denied any implied private 
cause of action for HTPAA breaches. As a result, the importance of the 
common law action for breach of confidence and similar causes of ac­
tion193 remains, notwithstanding HTPAA, unless and until the federal 
government legislatively preempts all “more stringent” state laws.
D. Limitations o f  H IPAA “Privacy”
The HTPAA federal standards apply to a broad range of “covered 
entities”194 that transmit health information in electronic form, but by no 
means to all entities that maintain health information in electronic form.
186. H um phers v. First In terstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527,530 (Or. 1985).
187. See id. at 528-29.
188. See, e.g., Colleen M. v. Fertility & Surgical Assocs. o f Thousand Oaks, 34 C-al. Rptr. 3d 439, 
443 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (applying California sta tu te’s general and specific disclosure exceptions). See 
also the savings provisions in Missouri’s S.B. No. 1041, 93d G eneral Assemb. (Mo. 2006) (2006) (oth­
erwise criminalizing “knowingly obtaining, receiving, or selling personal health inform ation without 
consent”).
189. Cf. W a s h . R e v . C o d e  A n n . § 70.02.170 (W est 2002).
190. H odge et al., supra note 5, at 1468.
191. See, e.g., Poli v. M ountain Valleys H ealth  Ctrs., Inc., No. 2:05-2015-GEB-KJM, 2006 W L 
83378, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11,2006); Univ. of Colo. Hosp. v. D enver Publ’g Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 
1144-45 (D. Colo. 2004); O ’D onnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield o f Wyo., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1176,1180 (D. 
Wyo. 2001).
192. See, e.g., C-mty. Hosp. Group, Inc. v. Blume Goldfaden Berkowitz Donnelly Fried & Forte, 
P.C.., 885 A  .2d 18 (N J.S u p e r. Ct. App. Div. 2005), m odified on other grounds, 894 A.2d 702 (N.J. Su­
per. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
193. See, e.g., D oe v. Smith, 913 So. 2d 140,143 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (finding patient stated claim 
for negligence when medical center violated state law by leaving patient records in parking lot where 
they could have been copied o r disseminated); Foster ex rel. J.L. v. Hillcrest Baptist Med. C-tr., No. 10- 
02-I43-C.V, 2004 W L 254713, at *3 (Tex. App. Feb. 11, 2004) (holding negligence action could be 
brought against hospital for failure to exercise reasonable care in form ulation o f confidentiality poli­
cies); see also Poli, 2006 W L 83378, at *3 (denying m otion to dismiss a negligence claim based on the 
release of medical information).
194. 45 C..F.R. § 160.103(2005).
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These providers,195 such as hospitals, physicians, and health plans, are 
subject to the regulations if they transmit health information “in elec­
tronic form in connection with a [HIPAA-EDI transaction].”196 The fed­
eral standards place limitations on the disclosure of “protected health in­
formation,”197 including information that “relates to the past, present, or 
future physical or mental health or condition of an individual”198 and 
identifies or could identify the individual.199 Thereafter, the provider 
may disclose private health information (PHI) only as permitted by the 
federal standards.200 Modeled as they are on existing state statutory pro­
tections, the HIPAA standards do not protect health privacy. The stan­
dards are in essence a federal confidentiality code based around a regula­
tory compliance model rather than one that creates patient rights.201 
H IPA A ’s principal achievements are to require that the entities it covers 
give patients notice of “privacy practices”202 and protect EHRs from ac­
cess outside of the entity without patient consent.203 Privacy notices and 
patient consent are relatively pro forma, in the views of some critics.204 
Although HIPAA has made it less likely that, for example, employers 
will access employee health records from insurance claims, it contains 
limited safeguards. For example, covered entities are not required to in­
form patients about unauthorized access to their records, although enti­
ties are required to provide an accounting of such access upon request.205
Unfortunately the federal standards are flawed and, as currently 
written, will do little to create patient trust or physician participation in 
an EIHR. In the words of one editorial: “With an Orwellian turn of 
phrase, the ‘privacy rule’ has little to do with patient confidentiality. In 
fact, it permits the widespread sharing of medical data among 800,000 or 
so health, business and government entities.”206 First, the standards con-
195. Defined in 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
196. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102.
197. I d  § 160.103.
198. Id. B ut see Rogers v. NYU Hosp. Cir., 795 N.Y.S.2U 438, 441 (Sup. Cl. 2005) (disclosing 
identity of patien t’s room m ate in general rehabilitation w here hospital would not disclose room m ate’s 
medical condition).
199 45 c  p  R  § 160.103.
200. Id. § 164.502(a).
201. “ [The legislation] does not focus on individuals whose privacy may be at risk, but instead on 
regulating persons who m ight have access to individuals’ health  inform ation.” Univ. of Colo. Hosp. 
A uth. v. D enver Publ’g Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1145 (D. Colo. 2004); see also Logan v. D ep ’t of 
V eterans Affairs, 357 F. Supp. 2d 149,155 (D.D.C. 2004).
202. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520.
203. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (requiring protection of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
all protected electronic health  inform ation). For a discussion of what H IPA A  does and does not ac­
complish, see M ark Rothstein, Currents in Contemporary Ethics: Research Privacy Under H IP A A  and 
the Com m on Rule, 33 J.L. M e d . & E t h ic s  154 (2005).
204. E.g., Pollio, supra  note 111; Mitchelle C. P ierre, Note: New Technology, Old Issues: The A ll­
Digital Hospital and Medical Information Privacy, 56 R u t g e r s  L. R e v . 541 (2004).
205. 45 C.F.R. § 164.528.
206. A  Dose o f  Bad Medicine, P h il a . I n q u ir e r , Jan. 6,2006, at A16; see also Theo Francis, Tak­
ing Control: Setting the Records Straight; When you sign medical-privacy forms, what exactly are you  
agreeing to? Probably not what you think, W a l l  S t. J. (Eastern edition), Oct. 21,2006, at R4.
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centrate almost exclusively on the process of patient consent to disclo­
sure. A true privacy-confidentiality regime should be more substantively 
concerned with limiting the collection and dissemination of personal 
health information. Questions of patient consent to disclosure only need 
to be addressed at the margins.
Second, the standards as amended by the Bush administration now 
lack any consent-to-disclosure provision for most healthcare activities.207 
That amendment deprived the patient of a symbolic privacy-autonomy 
“moment” at the commencement of the provider-patient relationship. 
More specifically, in the EHR context, the amended regulation removes 
any requirement for consent to disclosure for “routine uses”: “treatment, 
payment, or health care operations.”208 The amendment was challenged, 
in Citizens fo r  Health v. Leavitt, as violating constitutional rights and the 
enabling legislation.209 The Third Circuit ruled that any Fifth Amend­
ment substantive due process or First Amendment claims failed in the 
absence of state action.210 Further, the court held that the amendment 
was not ultra vires the HTPAA statute because, in part, the statutory pur­
pose was not to enhance patient privacy but to improve the efficiency of 
the healthcare system.211
Third, although HTPAA confidentiality is premised on national 
standards, the confusing and operationally obstructive “more stringent” 
partial preemption rule—the so-called HTPAA floor—undercuts this 
model.212 Tndeterminacy is further increased by the interplay between 
federal and state law regarding some “required by law” disclosures.213 
Tndeed, one circuit has held that a state’s more stringent medical-records 
privilege does not apply in federal-question actions.214
Fourth, the federal standards apply broad, arguably overbroad, ex­
ceptions (public health, judicial, and regulatory) where patient consent to 
data processing is not required.215
Fifth, the privacy standards are still too lax regarding secondary 
uses of patient information. There are still many unrestricted uses of pa­
tient information outside of treatment and billing; in too many situations
207. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502,164.506. In  contrast, 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 as originally prom ul­
gated generally required consent even for these routine uses.
208. “A  covered entity may obtain consent of the individual to use o r disclose protected health 
inform ation to carry out treatm ent, paym ent, o r health  care operations” § 164.506(b)(1).
209. 428 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2005). ’
210. Id. at 177-85.
211. Id. at 185. See the discussion of instrum entalism  supra Part lll.C .
212. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2005): see, e.g., United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatm ent Ctrs. 
of Am., Civ. No. 99-3298,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21830, at *10-12 (D.D.C.. May 17, 2004): N at’l A bor­
tion F ed’n v. Ashcroft, 03 Civ. 8695,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18,2004).
213. 45 C.F.R. 164.512 (2005): see, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 377 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2005) (Tennessee law in child abuse cases).
214. Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 925 (7th Cir. 2004): see also Kalinoski v. Evans, 
377 F. Supp. 2d 136,140-41 (D.D.C.. 2005).
215. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512: see, e.g., Kalinoski, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 139 (D.D.C.. 2005).
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patient consent for secondary uses is not required,216 and in other situa­
tions consideration should have been given to prohibiting some con- 
sented-to secondary uses (e.g., the sale of patient data for pharmaceutical 
marketing).217
Sixth, because of limitations in the enabling legislation, the federal 
standards simply could not include all medical data or all users of such 
data.218 There are gaps in the legislation caused by the “entities” or 
HIPAA-EDI premises that arguably deny protection to data held in 
some Personal or Trustee EHRs. Additionally, the “business associate” 
extension is a cumbersome and inefficient extension of the regulatory 
reach and is of dubious effectiveness as EIHR data processing is moved 
offshore.219
By way of example, consider Beard v. City o f  Chicago,220 a relatively 
obscure employment discrimination case against a fire department. The 
plaintiff sought production of documents describing medical leaves of 
absences taken by similarly situated coworkers. The fire department 
kept a large number of medical records, which were generated by both 
staff physicians who determined whether employees were fit to return to 
duty and (with employee consent) by employees’ outside treating physi­
cians. The defendant resisted production on the basis, inter alia, that pa­
tient records were protected by the HIPAA privacy regulations. An out­
sider unversed in the intricacies of HIPAA could be forgiven for thinking 
that the federal confidentiality rules would apply to the holder of medical 
records generated by medical personnel (albeit perhaps subject to some 
litigation exception). However, the court found three separate reasons 
why HIPAA was inapplicable. First, the HIPAA regulations apply only 
to health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, or healthcare providers who 
engage in HIPAA electronic transactions.221 The Beard court found no 
evidence that the fire department was a plan, clearinghouse, or other 
provider under the HIPAA definition.222 Further, even if the department 
was a healthcare provider, it was not engaging in electronic transac­
tions.223 Second, the court found that the medical records kept by the fire 
department did not constitute “protected health information” because
216. See generally 45 C .F .R . §§ 164.508, .510, .512.
217. There is also generalized laxness as H IP A A  compliance declines. See Nancy Ferris, Privacy 
Rule Compliance Said to Be Diminishing, G o v ’t  H e a l t h  IT , A pr. 19, 2006, available al 
http://govhealthit.com/article94120-04-19-06-W eb&RSS=yes.
218. See, e.g., Mathis, 377 F. Supp. 2d a t 645 (F B I n o t a covered  en tity ).
219. See, e.g., S.B. 1199, 47 th  Leg., 2d Sess. (A riz. 2006) (requ iring  consen t to  o ffsho re  o u tso u rc ­
ing o f h ea lth  in fo rm atio n  processing). See generally O r g . f o r  E c o n . C o -o p e r a t io n  a n d  D e v ., 
G u id e l in e s  o n  t h e  P r o t e c t io n  o f  P r iv a c y  a n d  T r a n s b o r d e r  F l o w s  o f  P e r s o n a l  D a t a  
(1980), available at http ://it.o jp .g o v /d o cu m en ts/O E C D _ F lP s .p d f.
220. B eard v. City o f Chicago, No. 03 C 3527,2005 U .S . Dist. L E X IS  374 (N.D. 111. Jan. 7,2005).
221. 45 C.F.R. § 164.104(a). For an explanation o f these transactions, see Nicolas P. Terry, A n  
eHealth Diptych: The Impact o f  Privacy Regulation on Medical Error and Malpractice Litigation, 27 
A m . J. L a w  &  M e d . 361,365-66 (2001).'
222. Beard, 2005 U .S. D ist. L E X IS  374, a t *8 (referenc ing  45 C .F .R . §§ 160.103,164.502 (2005)).
223. Id.
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the regulations explicitly excluded “individually identifiable health in­
formation in .. . employment records held by a covered entity in its role 
as employer.”224 Third, the regulations specifically permit disclosure of 
protected health information in response to a discovery request.225
In conclusion, as we further consider how to build patient and phy­
sician trust in an EIHR, one overarching problem with the HIPAA stan­
dards must be addressed: the standards are fatally flawed because they 
lack transparency and clarity. They may be labeled (really, mislabeled) 
as promoting “privacy,” but their sheer obliqueness detracts from any 
educative or principled “message.” What was required of the federal 
standards was a more generalized statement of principle based clearly on 
an autonomy-focused rationale, a legal guarantee that patients have con­
trol of their health information. As follows from earlier comments, ex­
ceptions should have been more narrowly constructed and tightly con­
trolled by concepts of proportionality and the circle of care.226
E. Medical Information and Inalienability
One of the most pervasive characteristics of the U.S. approach to 
medical confidentiality and privacy is that patients may sign away almost 
all extant controls on the collection or dissemination of personal health 
information. This was operationalized at common law through the doc­
trine of waiver227 and in state medical confidentiality statutes by authori­
zation provisions.228 Nowhere has this tendency been more obvious than 
in HIPAA’s Personally Identifiable Health Information (PIHI) regula­
tion. Indeed, PIHI reads less like a list of confidentiality protections and 
more like a catalogue of exceptions and, specifically, process rules for au­
thorizations to avoid confidentiality. For example, although the regula­
tion notes that authorizations are required for certain uses or disclosures 
of psychotherapy notes229 and some marketing uses,230 the bulk of the 
relevant regulatory text details the process to be followed to obtain such 
authorization.231
State laws that prohibit health information use or disclosures not­
withstanding authorization are very much the exception. However, these 
inalienability provisions provide an interesting model, particularly given
224. Id. al *8-9 (tiling 45 C.F.R. § 160.103); see also S lale ex rel. Cincinnali E nquirer v. Daniels, 
844 N.E.2d 1181 (O hio 2006) (finding lead-risk-assessmenl reports m ainlained by heallh deparlm enl 
and lead-cilalion nolices issued lo properly owners of unils reported lo be Ihe residence of children 
whose blood lesl resulls indicate elevated lead levels did nol contain “protected health inform ation”).
225. Beard, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 374, a t *9-10 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.512).
226. See generally Terry, supra note 109.
227. See, e.g., Mull v. String, 448 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1984); Fedell v. W ierzbieniec, 485 N.Y.S.2d 460 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
228. See, e.g., Ca l . C iv . Co d e  § 56.11 (W est 1982 & Supp. 2006).
229. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2).
230. § 164.508(a)(3).
231. § 164.508(b)(c).
Terry.doc 2/28/2007 4:56:44 PM
718 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2007
the tempting secondary uses for EIHR information. For example, along 
with related controls (e.g., prohibiting insurers from conditioning insur­
ability on genetic testing232) most states place some limitations on the use 
of genetic information in the health insurance domain, while a few also 
extend those limitations to life and disability insurance. Thus, many 
states prohibit the use of individuated genetic data for nontherapeutic 
purposes such as determining insurability or setting premiums.233 Rela­
tively few states undercut this prohibition by allowing for applicant con­
sent to its use.234 At the federal level, a presidential executive order pro­
hibits agencies from collecting genetic information concerning federal 
employees.235 There have been a series of bills introduced in Congress to 
make this proscription universal.236
Some AIDS/HIV reporting legislation has targeted similar issues.237 
State legislatures have tried to reduce disincentives to HIV testing by 
guaranteeing the confidentiality of the test results.238 For example, the 
Illinois statute permits test subjects to remain anonymous.239 While the 
same statute allows identified subjects to execute releases allowing for 
disclosure,240 its overall tenor is to considerably limit the dissemination of 
the results, utilizing need-to-know and limited circle of care models.241 
Finally, and perhaps of most interest for our purposes, is a recent New 
Hampshire law that prohibits the sale of prescription information (that 
contains patient or prescriber-identifiable data) “for any commercial 
purpose,” including advertising or marketing.242 Reportedly, the statute 
is being challenged on First Amendment grounds by data aggregators.243
V. P r iv a c y  a n d  C o n f id e n t ia l it y  St r a t e g ie s
Three types of strategies are available to reduce the risks associated 
with EHRs: specific system architectures, requirements for patient
232. See, e.g., A l a . C o d e  § 27-53-2(a) (L exisN exis 1998); K a n . St a t . A n n . § 40-2259(b)(l) 
(2000); M in n . St a t . A n n . § 72A .139(3)(1) (W est 2005).
233. See, e.g., A l a . C o d e  § 27-53-2(b); G a . C o d e  A n n . (2005) § 33-54-4; I n d . C o d e  A n n . § 27-8- 
26-5(2)-(4) (LexisNexis 1999); K a n . St a t . A n n . § 40-2259(b)(4); M in n . St a t . A n n . 
§ 72A.139(3)(3)(4) (W est 2005); O r . R e v . St a t . § 746.135(3) (2005); T e x . I n s . C o d e  A n n . § 546.052 
(V ernon 2006).
234. See, e.g., M o. R e v . St a t . § 375.1303-l(3)-(4) (2000).
235. Exec. O rder No. 13,145,65 Fed. Reg. 6877.1-202(c) (Feb. 8,2000).
236. See, e.g., Genetic Inform ation Nondiscrim ination Act of 2005, S. 306, 109th Cong. § 104 
(2005); Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrim ination A ct of 2003, H.R. 3636, 108th Cong. (2003) (intro­
duced to  the House of Representatives, Nov. 21,2003); Genetic Inform ation Nondiscrim ination A ct of 
2003, S. 1053,108th Cong. (2003).
237. See, e.g., C o n n . G e n . St a t . § 19a-583 (2005); 410 111. C o m p . St a t . 305/1 (2005).
238. Some public health officials argue the protections go too far. See Marc Santora, Overhaul 
Urged for Laws on A ID S  Tests and Data, N.Y. T im e s , Feb. 2,2006, at B l.
239. 410 111. C o m p . St a t . 305/6.
240. Id. 305/9(b).
241. See, e.g., 410 111. C om p. S t a t .  305/9(c)(h).
242. N.H. R e v . St a t . § 318:47-f.
243. Beth Herskovits, Freedom o f  Inform ation, P h a r m a c e u t ic a l  E x e c u t iv e , Sept. 1, 2006, 
available at http://www.pharmexec.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=369271.
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choice, and legal requirements can be combined to protect patient health 
information and generate the trust needed for an interoperable health 
record system to succeed. The balance of strategies chosen will depend 
on the EHR system architecture that is employed. The importance of 
developing successful strategies for protecting privacy and confidentiality 
cannot be emphasized too strongly.
Although the Markle Foundation’s data indicate public support for 
easily accessible electronic records, respondents to its 2005 survey over­
whelmingly (79%) regard it as a “top” or “high” priority that their medi­
cal information be shared electronically only with their consent.244 The 
vast majority of respondents (91%) want mechanisms in place to confirm 
the identity of anyone using the system and to guarantee against unau­
thorized access.245 Reviewing who has had access to personal health in­
formation is also a core priority (81%), with respondents (68%) unwill­
ing to give employers access to their health information.246
The Markle Foundation endorses seven patient and consumer prin­
ciples developed by the Personal Health Technology Council:
1. Individuals should be able to access their health and medical data 
conveniently and affordably.
2. Individuals should be able to authorize when and with whom 
their health data are shared. Individuals should be able to refuse 
to make their health data available for sharing by opting out of 
nationwide information exchange.
3. Individuals should be able to designate someone else, such as a 
loved one, to have access to and exercise control over how their 
records are shared.
4. Individuals should receive easily understood information about 
all the ways that their health data may be used or shared.
5. Individuals should be able to review which entities have had ac­
cess to their personal health data.
6. Electronic health data exchanges must protect the integrity, secu­
rity, privacy, and confidentiality of an individual’s information.
7. Independent bodies, accountable to the public, should oversee 
local and nationwide electronic health data exchanges. No single 
stakeholder group should dominate these oversight bodies, and
244. Press Release, M arkle Foundaiion, Americans Support Online Personal H ealth  Records; 
Patient Privacy and Control over Their Own Inform ation A re Crucial for Acceptance (Oct. 11, 2005), 
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consumer representatives selected by their peers should partici­
pate as full voting members.247
The recommendations we develop below endorse and develop these 
principles. At the outset, however, we must address the “do nothing” 
strategy. This approach could be premised either on an informed health­
care skeptic’s intuition that the financial and structural issues posed by 
EHR development are insoluble, or on the more cynical view that in a 
couple of years some other inexpensive-until-implemented State of the 
Union sound bite will replace universality of health records.248 Such a 
“do-nothing” strategy, however, cannot be countenanced because of the 
proliferation of PHRs and the growth of hospital and systemwide 
EMRs.249 The latter are not EHRs in the strictest sense but single EMRs 
implemented by large, often regional or national healthcare systems250 or 
even for federal government employees.251 While PHRs or systemwide 
EMRs may not offer the same interoperability or quite the same scale as 
NHTN-interlinked EHRs (and thus may be somewhat more secure), they 
raise identical privacy and confidentiality concerns as their EHR fellow- 
travelers.
A. System Architectures
Four different general types of EHR architectures are available at 
the present time, which we label as “Personal,” “Shared,” “Trustee,” and 
“Interoperable.” This final type, the Electronic Interoperable Health 
Record (EIHR), can be structured to operate either over a regional
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., Insiders Say Health Bill Unlikely to Pass This Year, G o v ’t  H e a l t h  IT , A pr. 12, 
2006, available at w w w .govhealihii.com /ariicle94051-04-12-06-W eb.
249. See, e.g., In -d ep ih  Focus: K aiser P e rm an en ce , H ealih C o n n ec i, h iip ://ckp .kp .o rg /kp indep ih / 
arch ive /indep ih_faq_all.h im l (exp lain ing  ih e  E M R  sysiem  in sia lled  by K aiser P e rm an en ie  and  d e ­
signed io  in ie g ra ie  ih e  reco rds  o f iis e igh i m illion  m em bers  in  n in e  sia ies); see also D e b o ra h  V rana , 
Kaiser’s Prescription fo r Medicine is Digital, L .A . T im e s , M ay 30, 2005, a i C l;  R .H . D o lin  e i al., Kaiser 
Permanente’s Convergent Medical Terminology, 11 M e d in f o  346 (2004). See generally G e o rg e  C. 
H a lverson , Reengineering Care with K P  HealthConnect, P e r m a n e n t e  J ., F all 2004, a i 28, available at 
h iip ://w w w .kp ihp .o rg /pub licaiions/docs/c is_healihconneci.pdf. In  ih e  pub lic  secio r, fo r exam ple, ihe  
D e p a r im e n i o f  V e ieran s  A ffairs, ih e  c o u n iry ’s la rgesi in ieg ra ied  h e a lih ca re  sysiem  w iih  180,000 
h e a lih ca re  p rofessionals  and  m o re  ih an  five m illion  p a iien is , uses ih e  sysiem w ide V isiA  E M R  sysiem  
io  sh are  reco rds  am ong iis faciliiies. See V e t e r a n s  H e a l t h  A d m in ., D e p ’t  o f  V e t e r a n s  A f f a ir s , 
V is t a A  M o n o g r a p h  2005-2006 (2006), available at h iip ://w w w .va.gov/visia_m onograph/docs/v isia_  
m onograph2005_06.pdf. T h e  D e p a r im e n i o f  D efense  p lans io  ro ll o u i iis ow n A rm e d  F orces H e a lih  
L ong iiud inal T echnology  A p p lica iio n  (A H L T A ) sysiem  (fo rm erly  know n as C H C S II) fo r all un i­
fo rm ed  serv ice p e rso n n e l and  ih e ir  fam ilies by 2011. A H L T A , h iip ://w w w .ha.osd .m il/A H L T A / 
defau li.c fm  (Iasi v isiied O ci. 15, 2006); see also B ob  B rew in , D O D ’s e-Health Record System to Be 
Ready in a Year, G o v ’t  H e a l t h  IT , Jan . 30, 2006, available at htlp ://govheallh ii.com /arlic le92145-01- 
30-06-W eb.
250. T h e  E M R  and  E H R  ie rm ino log ies b lend  som ew hai if  a  sysiem  c rea ies  iis sysiem w ide 
“ E M R ” by c reaiing  in ie ro p e ra b iliiy  be iw een  d iscre ie  E M R  sysiem s in sia lled  a i d iffe ren i siies.
251. See, e.g., F e d e ra l Fam ily  H e a lih  In fo rm a tio n  T echnology  A c t o f  2006, H .R . 4859, 109th 
C ong. (2006). See generally S tep h en  B arr, Bill to Promote Electronic Health Records, W a s h . P o s t , 
M ar. 2 ,2006 , a t D4.
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health information organization (RHTO) or national health information 
network (NHTN). Privacy, confidentiality, and security problems in­
crease as the interoperability of the EHR system increases, with a RHTO 
or NHTN system posing the most pressing issues.
I. Personal EH R Model
Tn a personal EHR (PHR) model, patients are the dominant man­
agers and custodians of their electronic medical records. The record con­
sists of information fields into which data are entered either by the pa­
tient or through data export, or managed by the patient from records 
maintained by the patient’s physician.252 One PHR model has patients 
subscribing to a web-based service that assists them in collecting data 
from one physician and then disseminating it to others. The “Continuity 
of Care” record proposed by the American Academy of Family Physi­
cians as a standardized form of summarized electronic records would be 
a convenient data model.253 With a fully personal EHR system, only the 
consumer can download, view, combine, or process all his records. Pa­
tients would then be able to choose which records or parts of records 
they would export. Exported records could be provided on a read-only 
basis, protecting against alteration or entry of additional material. Em­
ployers,254 hospital systems,255 and EMR vendors256 are also rolling out 
hybrid models that enable web-based access for patients to portions of 
their records for personal health monitoring. Future models could mimic 
personal financial management software such as Tntuit’s Quicken257 or 
Microsoft’s M oney.258
However, such individually maintained records have limited useful­
ness. Although these records may be a helpful source of information for
252. F or a description of system architecture, see William W. Simons, K enneth D. M andl, & Isaac 
S. Kohane, The PIN G  Personally Controlled Electronic Medical Record System: Technical Architec­
ture, 12 J. A m . M e d . I n f o r m a t ic s  A ss’n 47 (2005).
253. Am erican Academy of Family Physicians C enter for H ealth  Inform ation Technology, ASTM 
Continuity of Care R ecord (CCR ), http://www.centerforhit.org/x201.xml (last visited Oct. 15,2005).
254. See, e.g., Carol Korne, Toward a Digital Health-Care Ecosystem, W a l l  St . J. (Eastern edi­
tion), Oct. 25, 2005, at B2 (discussing web-based health records system for employees of IBM); Timo­
thy J. Mullaney, Dell Takes Health Care Online, Bus. W k . O n l in e , Apr. 7, 2006, http://www. 
businessweek.com/technology/ content/apr2006/tc20060407_825324.htm.
255. See, e.g., m yHealthFolders, https://myhealthfolders.com  (web-based health  and medical in­
form ation system offered by BJC H ea lth ca re  System); see also Hospital to Boost Branding with CD- 
R O M S fo r  Patients, P f iil a . Bus. J., Mar. 28, 2006, http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/ 
2006/03/27/dailyl2.html (discussing hospital program  to distribute medical records software to pa­
tients).
256. See, e.g., Cerner Touts Diabetes Internet Program, A s s o c ia t e d  P r e s s , Oct. 12, 2005, 
http://www.kansas.com/mld/kansas/news/state/12883385.htm (diabetes monitoring system).
257. Intuit recently announced plans to enter the P H R  m arket. May W ong, TurboTax M aker to 
Develop Health Care Management Software, A s s o c ia t e d  P r e s s , Apr. 13, 2006, http://mercurynews. 
com/mld/mercurynews/news/local/states/califomia/northern_california/14328152.htm.
258. See also Milt Freudenheim , W ebM D Wants to G o B eyond Inform ation, N .Y . T im e s , Feb. 23, 
2006, at C l (describing W ebM D agreem ents with health  insurers and employers to operate web-based 
P H R s).
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patients, they are less likely to be viewed as reliable by providers. De­
pending on patient choices and data sources, personal records may not 
always be comprehensive (longitudinal) or coded for interoperability. 
Personal records that use a standardized format and are drawn from 
standardized sources, such as the Continuity of Care Record, will be in a 
format that permits the greatest likelihood of interoperability.
At the same time, individually maintained electronic records have 
the least significant implications for privacy and security. The data in 
such personal records will be patient-provided and maintained, thus ena­
bling patients to keep information they regard as private out of the medi­
cal record. Confidentiality, however, will be more difficult to protect. If 
patients share records with providers, and providers make copies—as 
surely they will do for reference and liability purposes—there will be 
copies passed from the patients’ control. Once any part of a Personal 
EHR leaves a patient’s control and enters the control of a physician or 
system, more typical privacy, confidentiality, and security issues will 
arise. Providing copies on a read-only basis or incorporating other 
means of digital rights management (DRM) protects the record from al­
terations or additions, but not from further scrutiny or duplication 
through transcription.
Such personal health records could be maintained in a location of 
the patient’s choosing. If financial records are an apt analogy, these 
choices are likely to include home computers, office computers, portable 
hard drives, smart cards, thumb drives, or other personal information de­
vices (PIDs). Patients will have varying skills at maintaining their re­
cords; some will keep adequate backup copies, but others will leave PIDs 
with the only copy of their records in taxis with the same frequency that 
they lose their iPods. Some will sequester records on a home computer; 
others will wear their records on necklace PIDs. Such variability in data 
availability, confidentiality, and security are in the hands of the patient, 
and, at least to that extent, are subject to patient choice. When data are 
compromised or lost, moreover, it will be on an individual patient basis; 
there will be no large data banks of patient information subject to hack­
ing at a single swipe (at least for non-web-based PHRs). Because of the 
vagaries of patients’ abilities to maintain their data, however, such per­
sonal health records will not be adequate substitutes for medical records 
maintained by providers or systems.
2. Shared Models
A variety of systems are available in which physicians and patients 
share responsibility and control over electronic records, but the records 
remain silo-ed. When physicians retain control over their records silos, 
the model is physician-centric. The silo-ed records may not be interop­
erable, as with either paper records or many of the individual electronic 
records maintained today. Collecting the silo-ed records in a common
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format, such as the Continuity of Care Record or some of the systemwide 
formats described below, allows for easy transfer or incorporation into 
larger data sets. However, there is significant tension between en­
trenched local practices for maintaining data and the desire for interop­
erable formats.259
In consultation with patients and subject to patient consent, physi­
cians could transmit all, parts, or summaries of such records to patients, 
to other physicians, or to a centralized data warehouse. The most dis­
cussed example of this type of “push” system for sharing electronic re­
cords is the Australian HealthConnect system discussed earlier.260 As 
HealthConnect has been pilot tested, commentators have emphasized the 
importance of protecting patient confidentiality; in particular they focus 
on the requirement of patient consent before new information is entered 
and patient control of access to information that has already been en­
tered.261 Once data enter a centralized system, the difficulties of protect­
ing confidentiality intensify.
3. Trustee Models
In a trustee model, patients contract with a fiduciary to maintain 
their health records.262 Trustee models can be offshoots of a PHR in that 
the data remain in the control of the patient, who then pushes all or some 
of the data to a trusted third party. The patient sets the terms of the trust 
and instructs the trustee about the management of that information, in­
cluding to whom it may be disclosed, how long it may be kept, and who 
may add to the record. Such a model could also be an offshoot of a 
shared or physician-centric architecture if the physician, in consultation 
with the patient, initiates the “push” directly from the record to the trus­
tee.
A trustee model has limited privacy implications in that it is the pa­
tient who decides what data is transferred to the trustee. Confidentiality 
is protected by a trust agreement that governs further distribution of 
data, but is assured only to the extent that the trustee lives up to its fidu­
ciary responsibilities. Trustee models increase ease of access to data for
259. John E. M attison, R obert H. Dolin, & D iane Laberge, Managing the Tensions Between N a­
tional Standardization vs. Regional Localization o f  Clinical Content and Templates, 11 M e d in f o  1081 
(2004).
260. F or a description of the H ealthC onnect system, see G unter & Terry, supra note 30; R oger S. 
Magnusson, Data Linkage, Health Research and Privacy: Regulating Data Flows in Australia’s Health 
Information System, 24 S y d n e y  L. R e v . 5,46-50  (2002).
261. E.g., B ernadette McSherry, Ethical Issues in HealthConnect’s Shared Electronic Health R e­
cord System, 12 J.L. M e d . 60, 64 (2004); M oira Paterson, HealthConnect and Privacy: a Policy Conun­
drum  12 J.L. M e d . 80,80-81 (2004).
262. F or a description of a trustee m odel, see Paul T. Kostyack, Note, The Emergence o f  the 
Healthcare Information Trust, 12 H e a l t h  Ma t r ix  393 (2002). See also eH ealthTrust, http://www. 
ehealthtrust.com  (last visited Oct. 10,2006).
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mobile patients, but present concomitant data security issues; trustees of 
large data sets may be attractive targets for hackers.263
Moreover, once a trustee has authorized transmittal of a patient’s 
record, it is unclear how the dissemination of the data is controlled 
thereafter. One model would be for the information to flow into the re­
ceiving provider’s record, posing anew the issues of protecting confiden­
tiality and data integrity. Another model would limit any data trans­
ferred from the trustee to read-only (or some other form of DRM) such 
that the control of the data remains with the trustee and within the terms 
of the trust agreement. This model protects data integrity but risks to 
confidentiality remain.
Many different types of trustees are possible. The trustee could be 
a data warehouse or some other form of repository. Trustees could be 
for-profit, not-for-profit, or public entities. As the number and variety of 
trustees increase, so will the difficulties in protecting data security, confi­
dentiality, and transmissibility. A single trustee model might be prefer­
able; standards could be common across the nation and problems of pro­
tection would need to be solved only once. A single trustee could 
nonetheless offer different arrangements for data management and pro­
tection, depending on the patient’s choice.
4. Regional or National Models
A fully longitudinal, EIHR, whether operating at a regional 
(RHIO) or national (NHIN) level, has both the greatest advantages for 
patient care and public health and the most fundamental implications for 
patient privacy, confidentiality, and security. Current discussions suggest 
that a RHIO or NHIN could utilize either a data warehouse or 
pointer/records locator technical model. Models may be premised on the 
aggregation of existing EMR silos, common data standards, and sophisti­
cated data-mining tools that improve usability and maximize the return 
on investments.
These RHIO and NHIN models may have different technical secu­
rity implications, but they pose virtually identical privacy and confidenti­
ality issues. A regional organization has the advantage of potential pro­
tection and at least some standardization. But depending on how it is 
designed, it may not afford the full advantages of mobility. If patients 
see providers outside of the region, there would need to be methods for 
allowing both access and entry of data. Further, patients might not know 
which region maintained their records or if their records should move 
with them if they permanently relocate. If the different regional organi­
zations had different standards, moreover, patients might be confused
263. Lest this concern seem fanciful, for a list of data breaches in 2005, affecting over fifty million 
Am ericans, see Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches. 
htm  (last visited Oct. 10,2006).
Terry.doc 2/28/2007 4:56:44 PM
No. 2] ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS 725
about which standard governed their records. If a fully interoperable 
system is desired, therefore, it seems that the best option is a single na­
tional system. Recently, Dr. Brailer has stated, “Being a RHIO is a jour­
ney . . . .  We know it has a beginning and a middle, but we don’t know 
what the end looks like.”264 Dr. Brailer has acknowledged that RHIOs 
likely will morph from being fledgling technology infrastructures into 
governing or advisory bodies.265 For the federal government, therefore, it 
is clear that the future lies in a NHIN.
As follows from the discussion above, a national, fully interoperable 
architecture poses the greatest privacy, confidentiality, and security risks 
and suggests that the protection of personal health information will de­
pend on patient choice and legal protections.
B. Patient Choice
Legal mechanisms such as informed consent and privacv- 
confidentiality that operationalize patient interaction with medical ser­
vices typically provide that patients may waive autonomy-derived 
“rights.”266 Increasingly, however, such waivers tend to pay only lip ser­
vice to the underlying autonomy. Thus, informed consent (both in law 
and medical practice) tends to focus on the narrow issue of “consent” 
rather than the disclosure of information that increases patient choice 
and participation.267 Similarly, patient “consent” to information sharing 
is often a nonnegotiable precondition to treatment—there is no genuine 
choice. The challenge in the EHR setting, therefore, is to identify poten­
tial choices regarding patient participation in such a system—choices that 
range from opting out completely, through redacting specific data or re­
stricting occasions of disclosure, to reviewing the data that is included in 
the system.
/. Opting In or Opting Out
The initial option for patient choice is whether to enter into the sys­
tem in the first place. This option is most protective of patient privacy; 
patients may decide that they want to stay “local,” with their records, 
electronic or paper, either under their own control or at offices of their 
individual providers. As an NHIN is developed, it may be preferable to 
employ such an “opt-in” strategy for pilot programs. A trial period of
264. Brailer: R H IO s Will Need Makeovers, H e a l t h  D a t a  M g m t ., Feb. 2006, available at 
http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/html/news/NewsStory .cfm?articleld=12762.
265. Id.
266. See U.S. D e p ’t  o f  H e a l t h  & H u m a n  S e r v s ., O C R  P r iv a c y  B r ie f , Su m m a r y  o f  H IP A A  
P r iv a c y  R u l e  (2003), available at http ://w w w /hhs./gov/ocr/privacysum m ary.pdf (discussing consen t 
and  p rivacy  issues).
267. See generally Terry, supra n o te  109.
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perhaps five years would give some sense of the issues, both anticipated 
and unanticipated, that could arise with a NHIN.
As the reported data about patient preferences suggest, informed 
consent should be required before a patient is entered into the system. 
This consent must include decisions about what information will be in­
cluded, what access will be authorized and what will not be authorized 
without further consent, and what provisions will be in place to secure 
additional consent before data are revealed. Perhaps most importantly 
for patient trust in a NHIN, consent should also include basic informa­
tion about how data security will be protected and what steps will be 
taken to inform patients if there are security breaches.
If a NHIN comes into general use, however, it may be increasingly 
difficult in practice for patients to opt out of the network effectively. 
Physicians may come to rely on access to the network for information 
about their patients. They may use electronic searches or algorithms in 
assessing patients’ conditions or in determining how patients have been 
managed in the past. Patients who are not in the NHIN may be disad­
vantaged as a result and the choice to opt out will become illusory. The 
use of evidence-based protocols is a particular case in point; patients 
without electronic records might be managed far differently than patients 
with EHRs, and physicians might be more accustomed to using the EHR. 
Similarly, some physicians might rely on searches of the NHIN for data 
about drug allergies or drag interactions. Patients who do not have in­
formation in the NHIN may be at risk if providers become less effective 
at using patient-provided medical histories to guard against problematic 
responses to prescriptions. Opting out of the network as a method of 
protecting confidentiality will thus come at a price that will be unac- 
ceptably high to many. Legislation also would be required to guarantee 
access to care for, and eliminate discrimination against, patients who opt 
out.
2. Circle o f  Care
An alternative means to protect confidentiality is to reduce the size 
of the population that has access to a patient’s data. Making patient 
safety information available to all healthcare providers that are tangen­
tially involved in a patient’s care renders the level of privacy and security 
accorded that data a function of the weakest link in the system. Fully in­
teroperable data is also immeasurably more valuable for secondary uses 
(e.g., marketing) and is an irresistibly tempting target for commercial ag­
gregators.268 As it becomes more difficult for patients to opt out of inter-
268. T he level of commercial aggregation of personal inform ation was highlighted by Choice- 
Point’s acknowledgement that the personal financial records of m ore than 163,000 consumers in its 
database had been compromised. See United States v. ChoicePoint inc., No. 1:06-CV-00198 (N.D. Ga. 
filed Jan. 30, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf; Personal 
Information: Agencies and Resellers Vary in Providing Privacy Protections: Testimony Before the Sub -
Terry.doc 2/28/2007 4:56:44 PM
No. 2] ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS 727
operable networks, therefore, informed consent and patient confidential­
ity become increasingly important. Recognizing these pressures, we rec­
ommend that data in the system be available only to providers within the 
therapeutic circle of care (those within the patient’s medical team) on a 
need-to-know basis. This is not as radical a recommendation as it might 
seem; as we have emphasized earlier, it does not preclude a system de­
sign that permits the generation of anonymized data sets for quality im­
provement or public health purposes. Nor does it preclude architectures 
that permit data to be copied to different fields at the time of entry with 
patient consent.
3. Data Carveouts
An additional confidentiality-protective strategy would be to build a 
mechanism for placing certain aspects of the record in a “secure” enve­
lope, available only with specific permission of the patient. Obvious ex­
amples of sensitive information that might be carved out and secured in 
this way include mental health history and sexual/reproductive history 
(including abortion, sexual dysfunction, pregnancy, and even birth con­
trol). But it may not be easy to anticipate what information individual 
people would find especially important to safeguard. The data from the 
group at Johns Hopkins indicate that diagnoses of colon cancer are con­
sidered more sensitive by patients than other cancer diagnoses.269 Some 
people might regard treatment for acne, obesity, sleeplessness, or even 
conditions as common as hypertension as especially sensitive. The rule 
that is most protective of privacy would be to permit patients to stipulate 
what information should be secured, although records will be less useful 
if significant portions are secured and providers do not know which ones 
these are. Three models are available for securing some, but not all, in­
formation: a secure “envelope” model, a contextual disclosure model, 
and an access-edit model.
a. Secure Envelope
The envelope model assumes that the patient opts in to the system 
(or is given no choice), but is permitted to tag specific data as “highly
comm, on Commercial and Administrative Law and the Subcomm. on the Constitution, o f  the H. 
Comm, on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15 (2006) (siaiem eni of Linda D. Kooniz, D irector, Info. Mgmi. 
Issues, U.S. G ov’t Accountability Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06609t.pdf ( “A l­
though the inform ation resellers that do business with the federal agencies we reviewed have taken 
steps to protect privacy, these m easures were not fully consistent with the Fair Inform ation Practices. 
M ost significantly, the first four principles, relating to collection limitation, data quality, purpose speci­
fication, and use limitation, are largely at odds with the nature of the inform ation reseller business.”); 
Press Release, Fed. Trade Com m ’n, ChoicePoint Settles D ata  Security Breach Charges; to Pay $10 
Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consum er Redress (Jan. 26, 2006), available at http://www.ftc. 
gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.htm (referring to settlem ent); see also Steve Bailey, Your Data for Sale?, 
B o s t o n  G l o b e , Mar. 24,2006, at C l (detailing plans by providers to sell aggregated medical data).
269. Kass et al., supra note 93, at 266-67.
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confidential.” This data is then specially coded (e.g., with a DRM layer), 
and although it circulates within the ETHR, is not generally readable. 
The secure envelope could be opened only with a specific additional con­
sent from the patient or in the case of a particular medical interaction. 
Examples of the latter might include: “To be opened if unconscious in an 
HR." “To be opened in an OB/GYN emergency,” or “To be opened if 
psychotropic medications are prescribed.” Research would be required 
to determine how the conditions “on” the envelope could be coded so 
that they do not defeat the exercise by hinting at the secure data con­
tained within.
b. Contextual Disclosure
Context-specific disclosure requires the patient (likely in consulta­
tion with his provider) to create different layers of health information 
that are made available to the ETHR. These layers would then provide 
for context-specific disclosure. For example, ob/gyn-related data would 
only be available to ob/gyn providers. Research would be required to 
determine the impact of such limitations on health quality or medication 
safety. For example, if a patient was taking Lithium and being treated in 
an ER following an overdose, absent knowledge of the medication or 
underlying diagnosis, the patient would be at extreme risk as there is no 
screening test for detecting Lithium.
Patient-initiated carveouts aside, an ETHR system likely would have 
to be coded for some layer restrictions on data because of existing re­
strictions on the transparency of data involving, for example, HTV/ATDS 
or child abuse. At present, there are immense variations in state law re­
stricting data transparency. These variations would need to be addressed 
through the development of national standards or by allowing patients 
both to specify states in which they are likely to receive care and to code 
records to meet the regulations of the most restrictive state specified.
c. Access and Edit
Envelope storage or context constraints generally are discussed in 
terms of restrictions placed on the data upon input. However, compara­
ble rights could be given to patients using an Access/Edit model similar 
to that used by the HTPAA confidentiality standards or some state stat­
utes. Thus, a patient could be permitted to access his record and remove 
or request removal of specific data, or place restrictions on its dissemina­
tion (e.g., by moving it to a secure envelope). An Access/Edit system has 
the difficulties of any model in which some data are unavailable to treat­
ing physicians. Tt has the additional disadvantage for patient care that 
patients may use idiosyncratic judgment in securing records, but the con­
comitant advantage that patients will be able to exercise individualized 
preferences in this regard.
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4. Review and Audit
As a more powerful EIHR system is developed, problems with the 
integrity of records must also be addressed. Record inaccuracy or cor­
ruption can adversely affect patient care—far more so than if the inaccu­
rate record is buried in the office of an individual provider. Data security 
breaches carry the potential to release an entire record, rather than 
whatever fragment may be located in the office of an individual provider.
As electronic records are relied on more extensively, their accuracy 
will be important for patient safety and quality of care. Records gath­
ered far in the past may reappear with deleterious consequences. Pa­
tients thus should be able to review their records for accuracy to be able 
to ensure that old inaccuracies or errors do not recur in current ap­
proaches to care. If old paper records are transformed into electronic 
format, patients should be able to review what is included for accuracy 
and to limit linkages as appropriate. As new electronic records are cre­
ated, patients should be permitted to review them for accuracy to the 
same extent they currently can review paper records. When patients 
challenge the accuracy of records, corrections should be made and noted 
by providers where appropriate. If, in the judgment of the provider, a 
correction is not appropriate, there should be a way to note in the EHR 
that a particular aspect of the record has been challenged by the patient 
for accuracy but has not been amended by the provider.
Patients should also be able to ascertain whether the patient choice 
model selected has been employed appropriately to protect their privacy 
and data confidentiality. Patients should know whether secure enve­
lopes, context-specific disclosures, and other selective strategies have 
been implemented in their records.
The data about patient and consumer attitudes strongly support the 
importance to patients of knowing whether the security of their elec­
tronic information has been breached. Developers of electronic records 
must explore methods for keeping patients apprised of security breaches 
of their health information. HIPAA seems too weak; it requires simply 
that custodians of electronic health information keep records about ac­
cess that patients can review on request. The difficulty is that patients 
may not know that their records have been accessed and thus may not 
request information about access. A relatively simple alternative would 
be to keep a flagged list of who has accessed the records at the front of 
the record; the list should be readily apparent to the patient or anyone 
else accessing the record. A more aggressive strategy would permit pa­
tients to stipulate electronic contact information that they would like to 
have used if there are security breaches involving their medical records. 
A still more aggressive—but the most protective—strategy would follow 
California’s model for security breaches of electronic information: con-
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tact is required, but public notice of a security breach will suffice when 
contact information is not available.270
C. Legal Strategies
In May 2005, responding to criticisms about its Care Records Ser­
vice (CRS) system,271 the U.K. government issued the N H S Connecting 
fo r  Health Care Record Guarantee212 This EHR “bill of rights” provides 
that the NHS CRS system will
• allow only those involved in your care to have access to records 
about you from which you can be identified;
• show only those parts of your record needed for your care;
• allow only authorized people to access your records (who will 
need a ‘smart card’ as well as a password);
• allow you to control whether information in electronic records 
made about you by the organization providing your care can be 
seen elsewhere in the NHS.273
NHS also promised future technologies such that “if you are con­
cerned about particular entries . . .  rather than about the whole record, 
you will be able to ask us to keep parts of the record . . .  from general 
view and only share them with your permission . . .  .”274 Thus, the NHS 
plan endorses three confidentiality-privacy strategies: the “circle of 
care,” “opt out” and “sealed envelope,” which we will return to.
We believe that patient privacy and confidentiality cannot be ade­
quately protected in a U.S. EIHR environment without similar strategies 
and, inevitably given our context, federal statutory or regulatory atten­
tion. A  fortiori we believe such legal attention will be necessary to deal 
with the informational dangers associated with the likely choice of a na­
tional EIHR (NHIN) system. In this Section, we outline what we believe 
are the four key legal protections that must be introduced: first, some 
types of medical data should be protected against even consented-to col­
lection or disclosure; second, all healthcare information should reside 
only in the medical domain; third, as a default position healthcare infor­
mation should flow only within the patient’s circle of care; fourth, an in­
dependent regulatory body should be appointed that will have the power
270. See generally Ca l . C iv . C o d e  § 1798.29 (W est 2006).
271. See supra text accompanying note 41.
272. N a t ’l  H e a l t h  S e r v . (U.K.), T h e  Ca r e  R e c o r d  G u a r a n t e e  (2005), available at 
hUp://w w w .conneclm gfo rhealth .nhs.uk /a lL im ages_and_docs/c rbb /crs_guaran lee_2 .pd f.
273. Id. a l 3.
274. Id. al 7. Notwithstanding, critics and opinion polls continue to criticize the program  for its 
potential damaging effects on physician-patient confidentiality. See Sam Lister, Medical Database Is 
Huge Security R isk and Freedom Threat, Say Doctors, T im es  (London), June 30 ,2005 , at 24.
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to review the manner in which patient information is handled by any 
EIHR system and resolve disputes.
/. Exclusion o f  Data Types and Inalienability
The legal model for privacy and confidentiality in the United States 
has generally endorsed the approach that any and all personal informa­
tion (be it financial, medical, etc.) may be collected, processed, and dis­
seminated with the consent or authorization of the data subject. The 
primary operational objection to this approach is that “consent” proc­
esses are imperfect in situations involving parties with radically different 
bargaining strengths or in informational asymmetry regarding the impli­
cations of any such consent or authorization. A secondary objection is 
that data protection is sectoral: both technical and regulatory regimes 
among varying types of data such as financial records, insurance records, 
health records, employment records, and court records. It may be very 
difficult for people to understand and remember the differences associ­
ated with these different regimes. Gaps in data protection may be espe­
cially apparent if data are transferred across regimes, as when health re­
cords are made available to insurers or employers.275 A third difficulty is 
that most data regulation is state based,276 with state laws applicable to 
medical and insurance domains varying widely; any NHIN system will 
transcend state boundaries and thus pose the issue of whether protection 
is only as strong as the weakest link.
Assuming movement towards a fully interoperable national EHR 
and full inclusion of patient and physician stakeholders in its develop­
ment, the most important measure would be a federal statute that over­
rides any consent/authorization regime and guarantees that certain types 
of private information cannot find their way into an EIHR.
Specifically, lawmakers should place limits on the collection of cer­
tain EHR information, such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
tracking data outside of hospital or pharmacy premises. Similarly, in­
alienability rules (regardless of “consent”) should be applied to the dis­
closure of genetic information or AIDS/HIV data outside of the medical 
domain.
2. Medical Domain
Because of the great power and scope of the likely information in a 
complete EHR on a given patient, at this time EHRs should be em­
ployed for treatment purposes only. That is, they should be accessible
275. See, e.g., R ebecca  L. W o o d ard , N o te , Is Your Medical Information Safe? A  Comparison o f  
Comprehensive and Sectoral Privacy and Security Laws, 15 In d .  I n t ’l  &  C om p. L. R e v . 147 (2004).
276. T h e  H IP A A  confiden iia liiy  code ‘‘ex cep tio n ” p roves ihe  gen era l ru le  because  o f iis ‘"more 
s trin g en t” p a rtia l p reem p tio n  rule. See supra tex t accom panying  n o te  212.
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only to patients themselves and to healthcare providers for medical man­
agement. Specifically, legislation is necessary to lock out secondary users 
(e.g., pharmaceutical companies, life insurers, and employers) and to 
prohibit the commercial aggregation of identifiable EHR-sourced data.
Other uses of the entire EHR by healthcare providers—for billing 
purposes, for cost management, or for evidence—should not currently be 
permitted. These uses are simply too risky for patients if EHRs are re­
leased on an all-or-nothing basis. EHRs should not be available for 
these other purposes even on a consensual basis; patients may be un­
aware of what is in the record and what such consent really means. The 
information can be acquired in other ways. For example, unlinked elec­
tronic records in individual providers’ offices could be used instead—just 
as paper records are today. If this is regarded as impractical, an alterna­
tive would be to allow entries in specified fields—but not the entire 
E H R —to be released with consent from the patient or the patient’s rep­
resentative. Or, at the point of entry, given data could be transferred 
with the patient’s consent—e.g., for billing purposes. To be sure, achiev­
ing this separation presents a problem of software design; as providers 
enter data into an EHR, there will be a need to separate data for the 
NHIN from data used for billing purposes. But the full power of the 
identifiable EHR should, as systems are developed, be restricted to the 
medical domain.
3. Circle o f  Care
As discussed above, existing U.S. confidentiality provisions do little 
to limit the dissemination of patient-specific health information within 
the health domain. That is, once the data is entered, it is freely available 
to healthcare providers.
The common law position was discussed by the D.C. Court of Ap­
peals in Suesbury v. Caceres,277 a case involving the alleged disclosure of a 
patient’s HIV-positive status between doctors in the same medical office 
in the context of a complaint about one doctor sexually molesting the pa­
tient. The court noted that “[djoctors within the same medical office 
should be allowed to work together with some latitude of freedom of 
communication not only to treat patients, but also to respond to patient 
administrative requests and, as here, patient complaints.”278 Cognizant 
that, although the doctors shared a practice, the context of the alleged 
disclosure was not strictly medical, the court concluded:
It is true that, in the case before us, the communication was 
not made in connection with the immediate on-going treatment of a 
common patient. Nonetheless, the communication was related to 
and arose as a consequence of such medical treatment and was
277. Suesbury v. Caceres, 840 A.2d 1285 (D.C. 2004).
278. Id. al 1289.
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made in the course of the business of administering the mutual
medical practice.279
The HIPAA confidentiality code applies a similar, and similarly 
flawed approach, providing that a “covered entity may use or disclose 
protected health information for treatment, payment, or health care op­
erations,”280 with disclosure permitted if it is for the entity’s “own treat­
ment, payment, or health care operations,”281 the “treatment activities of 
a health care provider,”282 or the “payment activities” of the recipient en­
tity.283 We believe that patient confidentiality would be better served if 
the data and its dissemination were subject to a default limitation based 
on necessity or proportionality. For example, a “privacy” rule could 
limit the collection of patient data to that required for the contemplated 
procedure. Equally, a “confidentiality” rule could limit the dissemina­
tion of the patient data to those providers directly involved in the pa­
tient’s current treatment, restricted to the “circle of care” or within the 
patient’s medical team.
4. Regulatory Overview and Dispute Resolution
As already noted, the federal confidentiality rule is flawed in large 
part because its opaque regulatory language makes it difficult for pa­
tients and providers to understand the importance of health privacy and 
confidentiality.284 Worse, its enforcement is in the hands of the Office for 
Civil Rights, Department of Health and Human Services.285 As a result, 
from a patient’s perspective, enforcement is placed in the hands of an 
“insider” primarily interested in ensuring the efficiency of the HIPAA- 
EDI transactional model. From a provider’s perspective, HIPAA regu­
lation and enforcement have added yet another layer of detailed regula­
tion of healthcare and another possibility for heavy penalties or even 
criminal sanctions.
In contrast, a traditional “rights” analysis would suggest that those 
who suffer privacy-confidentiality violations should be given private 
rights of action against the violators, a position refuted by HIPAA and 
most state medical privacy laws, yet permitted by common law actions 
such as breach of confidence.286 While it should be obvious that we are
279. Id. In a footnote the court left itself some room  for future m aneuver with the comment, “We 
limit our holding here, however, to the facts before us, namely, a communication between two physi­
cians working together in the same m edical practice, and leave a broader analysis for another day.” 
Id. at 1288 n.4.
280. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a) (2005).
281. Id. § 164.506(c)(1).
282. Id. § 164.506(c)(2).
283. Id. § 164.506(c)(3).
284. See supra text accompanying note 226.
285. U.S. D ep ’t of H ealth  & H um an Servs., Office for Civil R ights—H IPA A , http://www.hhs.gov/ 
ocr/hipaa/ (last visited Oct. 15,2006).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 189-94.
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privacy advocates and view violations of privacy or confidentiality as ex­
tremely serious and potentially very harmful to patients, we do not be­
lieve that most informational transgressions rise to the level of personal 
injuries. Any extension of traditional private rights in this area would 
merely embroil privacy and confidentiality in the politics287 and cycles of 
tort retrenchment associated with the “malpractice crisis.”
Rather, what is required is an independent, apolitical institution 
that can educate both patients and providers with codes of conduct and 
resolve disputes in a constructive, nonlitigious way. The model described 
is that of a government-funded independent agency or ombudsman. 
Australia,288 Canada,289 New Zealand.2'1’ and the United Kingdom291 have 
all adopted such regulatory review and dispute resolution models as part 
of their data protection regimes and most have been particularly active in 
the health domain. For example, the Australian Privacy Commissioner is 
legislatively tasked with complaint investigations and audits and pub­
lishes data protection guidelines.292 Specifically within the health do­
main, the Commissioner has published the influential Guidelines on Pri­
vacy in the Private Health Sector,293 which spell out in comprehensible 
fashion both the general principles of health privacy and seek to provide 
guidance for specific issues. We believe that Congress should promul­
gate an EHR “bill of rights” and appoint an independent Health Privacy 
Commissioner charged with the mandate to educate patients, providers, 
and regulators and equipped with the powers to mediate disputes and 
publish codes of conduct.
VT. CONCLUSION
Tn May 2005, Secretary Leavitt labeled the movement to electronic 
records an “economic imperative” designed to “maintain health and at
287. ‘"Despite the health  care system’s acute need—indeed because of it—broad coalitions across 
the political spectrum  are tem pted to co-opt medicine to advance larger agendas about the effect of 
lawsuits on social stability and economic p rosperity .. . .  [N]o m atter which camp claims victory in the 
overall battle, the outcom e will not rem edy serious deficiencies in how Am erican law deals with m edi­
cal errors.” William M. Sage, Understanding the First Malpractice Crisis o f  the 21st Century, H e a l t h  
L. H a n d b o o k  28 (Alice Gosfield ed., W est G roup 2003).
288. Office of the Privacy Com m ’r (Austl.), A bout the Office, http://www.privacy.gov.au/about/ 
index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
289. Office of the Privacy Comm’r of Can., A bout Us, http://www.privcom.gc.ca/aboutUs/ 
index_e.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). Additionally, some Canadian provinces have their own Privacy 
Commissioners. For example, the Inform ation and Privacy Commissioner for O ntario has published 
guidelines for using R FID  tags in O ntario public libraries. A nn C a v o u k ia n , Ph.D ., G u id e l in e s  f o r  
U s in g  R F ID  T a g s  in  O n t a r io  P u b l ic  L ib r a r ie s  (2004), http://www.ipc.on.ca/docs/rfid-lib.pdf. The 
O ntario  Commissioner is also responsible for aspects of health  privacy under the province’s Personal 
H ealth  Inform ation Protection Act, 2004.
290. Privacy Com m ’r (N.Z.), Y our Privacy, http://www.privacy.org.nz/your-privacy (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2006). ‘
291. U.K. info. Com m ’r ’s Office, http://www.ico.gov.uk/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
292. Office of the Privacy Comm’r, supra note 288.
293. O f f ic e  o f  t h e  F e d . P r iv a c y  C o m m ’r  (A u s t l .), G u id e l in e s  o n  P r iv a c y  in  t h e  P r iv a t e  
H e a l t h  S e c t o r  (2001), available at http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/hg_01.html.
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the same time maintain the momentum of our economy.”294 There is lit­
tle doubt that a well-constructed, secure ETHR can improve the quality 
of our healthcare, reduce medical and medication errors, and provide a 
platform for patients to better understand and participate in their health­
care. However, progress towards these laudable goals has, so far, re­
flected institutional interests and priorities. Tt has been an example of 
“insider baseball” that has focused primarily on architecture and techni­
cal standards. The debate now must be broadened to reflect the interests 
and participation of patients and physicians and to incorporate a princi­
pled, autonomy-based, and comprehensible privacy-confidentiality struc­
ture for EHRs.
Prior to his resignation from ONCHIT,295 Dr. Brailer argued for a 
sea change in the relationship between patients, physicians, and medical 
records whereby physicians will relinquish ownership of medical records 
and, instead, become their “stewards”: “[I]n black and white, no ques­
tions asked, the data belongs to patients.”296 Or, in the President’s recent 
words: “We’re really talking about making sure each American has an 
electronic medical record over which he or she has got control of the pri­
vacy.”297 These strong protective concepts must be fully operationalized. 
A cavalier, instrumental, HTPAA-like business-as-usual approach to the 
privacy and confidentiality of ETHR data will not suffice. Hard choices 
must be made as to the architectural and patient consent models that 
may involve subjugating some interoperability and comprehensiveness 
ambitions to principled protections of patient autonomy. Equally, some 
simple tweaking of the HTPAA confidentiality rules is insufficient. Pa­
tient privacy and confidentiality must be more broadly protected with 
principled and comprehensible bright-line legislation.
294. E sther Landhuis, Health Chief: Put Data Online, M e r c u r y  N e w s , May 24,2005, http://www. 
mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/living/health/11723708.htm.
295. N icholas T im m ins, Top U.S. Health Official Steps D ow n , F in . T im e s , A p r. 20,2006.
296. A nd is Robeznieks Brailer: I T  Can Help Reverse Culture o f  Errors, Inefficiencies, M o d . 
P h y s ic ia n , Sept. 23,2005, http://www.rnodernphysician.com/news.cms?newsld=4034.
297. Press Release, W hite House, President Participates in Panel Discussion on H ealth  Care Ini­
tiatives (Feb. 16,2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060216-3.html.
